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Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation:
Moving beyond the Entropic Dilemma
Sungjoon Cho*
I NTRODUCTION
In the early 1990s, as the historic Uruguay Round struggled toward a
successful conclusion, a panel established under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”),1 which had governed international trade for the
previous half century, struck down a recently enacted US embargo on Mexican
yellow-finned tuna.2 The US Marine Mammal Protection Act of 19723 had
proscribed a certain controversial tuna fishing practice that inevitably caused the
incidental killing of dolphins on a large scale. The gist of the panel’s ruling was
that the US embargo was not necessary to protect marine mammals because the
US had failed to explore other reasonable, less trade-restrictive alternatives,
including reaching a cooperative arrangement with tuna exporters such as
Mexico.
Whatever the merits of the panel decision, environmentalists in the US and
other Western countries led popular protests against the decision based on the
view that it had arrogantly countermanded a widely popular domestic measure
intended to protect the beloved dolphin, as well as other endangered marine
mammals. Some protesters performed a scene in which “GATTzilla,” a
demonization of GATT as the famed Japanese monster, devoured helpless little
*
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Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, SJD
2002 (Harvard). I thank Professors Joseph Weiler, William Alford, Joel Trachtman and Dean
Anne-Marie Slaughter for their support and inspiration. I am grateful to Matthew Christensen for
his valuable comments on an earlier draft. I am also indebted to the editorial efforts of Wonbin
Kang and the other staff members of the Chicago Journal of International Law. All errors, of course,
are mine.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts 485 (GATT Secretariat 1994) (hereinafter GATT 1947).
GATT Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R–39 S/155 (Sept
3, 1991).
Pub L No 92-522, 86 Stat 107 (1972), codified at 16 USC § 1361 (1994).
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dolphins. Through this and other similar publicity methods, protesters were
quite successful in depicting GATT—and free tradists in general—as coldblooded monsters that cared little about legitimate environmental causes.
In the late 1990s, hope and frustration contended once again in the lead-up
to the historic Seattle Round, which was marred by a protest with an estimated
50,000 to 100,000 participants. This global alliance of protesters, unprecedented
in scale and intensity, accused the World Trade Organization (“WTO”),4 the
successor to the old GATT, of ignoring environmental values in the name of
free trade. This time, the alleged victims were sea turtles sacrificed in the process
of shrimp harvesting. In a decision rendered not long before the Seattle
Ministerial Meeting, the WTO Appellate Body struck down a US ban on shrimp
harvested by India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand which used shrimping
methods that inevitably caused the incidental killing of sea turtles on a large
scale. The Seattle protest was fueled by a generalized antiglobalization mood,
reinforced by an unlikely alliance between “Turtles and Teamsters,” and finally
aided by then President Bill Clinton’s unexpected expression of sympathy for
the goals of the street protesters. In the end, the Seattle Round proved to be a
fiasco.
The two cases described above illustrate a glaring tension between free
trade and social regulations in areas such as environmental protection. On the
one hand, such tension eloquently demonstrates the existence in a
phenomenological sense of a certain “link” or “linkage” between various
competing values associated with the regulation of international trade. In fact,
this linkage seems an inevitable phenomenon considering the multiplicity of
values that individuals, states, and institutions pursue. People seem to desire free
trade—or at least global free markets, driven by the principle of efficiency—that
expands economic opportunity and promotes material welfare. At the same
time, they also yearn for a better quality of life—including better social hygiene
in the areas of environmental quality and human safety—and value the principle
of regulatory autonomy.
Yet in the real world, such values and policy objectives are not formulated
or analyzed in isolation. Rather, they tend to be addressed in combination by
means of relational approaches that emphasize areas of mutual influence. This
relational posture, which is strongly influenced by the current high level of
economic interdependency, is itself a function of the natural linkage among the
values in question.

4

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, in The Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts 6 (cited in note 1) (hereinafter WTO
Agreement).
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On the other hand, tension stemming from competing values constitutes a
threat to the institutional integrity of the global trading system. Since no trading
system can long survive a high degree of internal friction, hostility, or
contradiction, the global trading system has tended to try to eliminate or at least
mitigate such internal tension wherever possible. From a deontological
perspective, linkage or “trade and . . .” phenomena should be addressed
effectively in order to maintain a healthy global trading system.
Given the normative significance of the linkage phenomenon for the future
of international trade, it comes as no surprise that international law scholars
have recently attempted to diagnose and prescribe solutions from a variety of
analytical perspectives. Yet despite the richness and creativity of this growing
body of literature, the existing works still leave much to be desired. For instance,
however ambitious they may be, many are too theoretical or hypothetical,
leaving their practical or pragmatic value in doubt.5 A more serious problem lies
in their failure or inadequate devotion to analyze the telos of the global trading
system—that is, “what the global trading system is for” and “where it should be
directed”—in the context of the linkage debate. Just as any meaningful
prescription for institutional change must be rooted firmly in a clear
understanding of the identity and purpose of that institution, so it is that any
normative or institutional attempt to tackle linkage issues must be premised on
the very rationale of the contemporary global trading system, for example, the
coherent pursuit of trade and social values.6 Otherwise, any approach to linkage,
however ingenious it may appear on the surface, will ultimately prove to be
vulnerable to attack from either side.
Focusing on the tension between free trade and social regulation, this
Article argues that the WTO, in alliance with other international institutions,
must develop a synergistic, nonentropic linkage within the constitutional
structure of the global trading system. In the analysis set forth below,
considerable emphasis is placed on the concept of a “trade constitution.” This is
because any practical prescriptions for achieving the desired synergy must
necessarily flow from an accurate understanding of the capabilities and
constraints of legal and political realities inherent to a broad multisphere trading
system composed of Member states, the WTO, and other international
organizations. In each context, the development of a synergistic solution will
require us to select, depending upon institutional feasibility, from a variety of
institutional options reflecting various degrees of linkage. For example, the
WTO jurisprudence on trade and the environment has a different meaning, and
makes a different contribution to a synergistic linkage between free trade and
5
6

See Sections II–III of this Article for an extended discussion of this issue.
See Sections III–IV.
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environmental protection, than do discussions and recommendations under the
WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment. This pragmatic multifaceted
approach will eventually form the basis of a holistic vision of the global trading
system.
In the discussion that follows, Section I begins by exploring the genesis of
linkage. Although its relative emphasis may be a recent development, linkage is
not itself a new phenomenon, but a long-contemplated topic in the history of
international trade. Section II surveys and categorizes the contemporary linkage
debate from three aspects: motivation (why to link), desirability (whether to link),
and issue areas (what to link). It then critiques the existing literature, arguing that
representative works are either too hypothetical, unempirical, or narrowly
focused on particular regulatory topics. Against the backdrop of this critique,
Section III shifts the focus of the linkage debate to the tension between free
trade and social regulation. Based on the view that this tension could, if left
unaddressed, ultimately lead to an entropic disaster of either trade failure or
regulatory failure, Section IV proposes a synergistic understanding of competing
values that emphasizes, and is consistent with, the WTO’s integrationist telos.
Based on this synergistic vision, and within the bounds of institutional feasibility,
Section IV explores a multifaceted list of options, the implications of which
extend well beyond the narrow terrain of WTO activities. These options include
jurisprudence, harmonization, surveillance, international standards and
government networks, and interinstitutional cooperation. In a brief conclusion, I
argue that the proper management of linkage will enhance the legitimacy of the
global trading system as a whole.

I. T HE G ENESIS OF L INKAGE
The history of linkage dates back to the dawn of the modern global trading
system. After the end of World War II, the Allies, at the behest of the US, came
up with an ambitious blueprint for a postwar international economic order. This
project, commonly known as the “Bretton Woods system,”7 comprised three
main pillars: “international trade” under the auspices of an International Trade
Organization (“ITO”), “international monetary and financial matters” under the
auspices of the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), and “international
development” under the auspices of the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development. Initially, the operational sphere of the ITO was very broad,
addressing a number of important social issues such as labor and competition

7

Bretton Woods is a small resort town in New Hampshire that hosted the epic meetings at which
the broad outlines of a postwar international economic order were conceived.
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policy that lay outside the scope of international trade per se.8 In this initial
linkage between trade and nontrade, the inclusion of social concerns must be
understood in the context of the bitter social upheaval that accompanied the
Great Depression and scattered the seeds of World War II.9
Yet this grand vision never materialized, mainly because the US
administration at the time failed to secure congressional approval for the
creation of the ITO. Interestingly, it was the inclusion of such subjects as labor
and unemployment that undermined congressional support for the ITO. The
Republican-dominated Congress was resistant to the idea that the Executive
Branch should play such a comprehensive role in the international arena without
the traditional checks and balances. Following the official demise of the ITO
and a number of intermittent efforts to revive it, the grand enterprise was
reduced to GATT. Originally conceived as one of many chapters of the ITO
Charter, GATT took the form of an executive agreement with the Protocol of
Provisional Application consisting of little more than derogations and
exemptions. Nonetheless, even in this minimalist approach, a certain link
between trade and social regulation could be found. Whereas GATT Articles I
and III enshrined bedrock free trade principles such as Most-Favored Nation
and National Treatment, Article XX (General Exceptions) responded to a
variety of social concerns, such as protection of the environment and human
health, and provided that they could, under certain circumstances, override the
free trade obligations set forth in other provisions. Although a detailed
discussion of the historical development of the international trading system is
beyond the scope of this Article, the foregoing summary should suffice to
illustrate that linkage is not a new issue per se.10 On the other hand, the
phenomenon of linkage has recently begun to receive an unprecedented degree
of scholarly attention for reasons that will be discussed in the following section.

8
9

10

See John H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT (Bobbs-Merrill 1969).
For a general discussion, see John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions and Change:
Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 Intl Org 379 (1982). See also Anne-Marie
Burley, Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the Projection of the New Deal
Regulatory State, in John Gerard Ruggie, ed, Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an
Institutional Form 125 (Columbia 1993).
See Debra P. Steger, Afterword: The “Trade and . . .” Conundrum—A Commentary, 96 Am J Intl L 135
(2002). See also John H. Jackson, The Perils Of Globalization and the World Trading System, 24
Fordham Intl L J 371, 374 (2000):
[S]ome people in the United States have argued that we should reverse course
and take the WTO back to the time when it was responsible only for border
measures, thereby limiting its ability to affect national regulation internally. . . .
This is folly, because such time never existed. It was always recognized that
there were measures in GATT that would have effects behind the border.
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II. T HE L INKAGE N ARRATIVES : C URRENT D EBATES
A. C ATEGORIZATION
The recent academic debate surrounding the linkage issue has produced a
voluminous and expanding literature. Containing as it does many useful insights
and contributions, a careful review of this literature is a necessary prerequisite to
the task of diagnosing problems and prescribing solutions to the linkage issue. A
detailed and systematic review of such a rich and variegated body of work,
however, would require far more space than a brief article permits.11 Therefore,
the focus of the following critique of this literature is restricted to three major
concerns: motivation (why to link), desirability (whether to link), and issue areas
(what to link). Importantly, these three aspects of linkage are inseparably
connected to one another. For example, the “desirability” of linkage tends to
influence its “motivation.” Those who advocate the close linkage of human
rights to trade may hold a great incentive in strategizing their position in the
negotiation settings.12 For another example, “issue areas” are naturally revealed
in the course of analyzing the “desirability” of linkage. Those who denounce the
linkage of human rights to trade as yet another manifestation of protectionism
would naturally strive to exclude this area from the normative reach of
international trade.

B. V ARIOUS A SPECTS OF L INKAGE
1. Motivation (Why to Link)
Some scholars view linkage not only as a natural phenomenon, driven by
economic interdependency, but also as a purposeful enterprise. For instance,
Frieder Roessler argues that linkage proposals, such as “green[ing]” the WTO or
“tak[ing] up” labor rights, aim to “change domestic policies in these [issue]
areas” via trade restrictions.13 He suggests four motivations behind these
proposals: “offset[ing] differences between domestic policies,” “eliminat[ing]
11

12

13

For another attempt to categorize the linkage literature, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, “Trade and”: Recent
Developments in Trade Policy and Scholarship—And Their Surprising Political Implications, 17 Nw J Intl L
& Bus 759, 760–761 (1996–97) (identifying three different approaches to linkage: “traditional,”
“critical,” and “interdisciplinary”).
See Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement Mechanism for Basic Human Rights: A
Proposal for Addition to the World Trade Organization, 11 Am U J Intl L & Poly 1, 34 (1996)
(proposing the creation of a side agreement as a “human rights arm” under the WTO system to
enforce human rights via trade sanctions).
Frieder Roessler, Diverging Domestic Policies and Multilateral Trade Integration, in Jagdish Bhagwati and
Robert E. Hudec, eds, Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade? Vol 2: Legal Analysis
21, 36 (MIT 1996).
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differences between domestic policies,” “domestic bargaining across issue
areas,” and “international [political] bargaining across issue areas.”14 He then
criticizes these motivations by arguing that a tariff or subsidy can be a better tool
to offset such differences, that positive harmonization to eliminate such
differences is hard to achieve under the WTO, that trade restrictions should not
be employed to support “domestic political coalitions” among interest groups,
and that linkages beyond manageably related issue areas cannot be stably
maintained.15
From yet another purposeful standpoint, certain subject matters or issue
areas can be exchanged and bargained for in negotiation settings. For instance,
in the Uruguay Round negotiation, developed countries successfully included
new issues such as intellectual property rights and services in the WTO system in
return for acceptance of developing countries’ perennial wish lists, including a
phase-out of textile quotas.16 David Leebron depicts this strong “reciprocal”
type of linkage as “strategic linkage”17 or “issue barter.”18 In a similar tone, José
Alvarez describes the “nesting” of various subjects within the WTO.19 Yet
scholars like John Jackson challenge this type of linkage on the ground that
reciprocity, unlike traditional tariff negotiation, does not address the “non-tariff”
regulatory barriers that most linkage issues involve.20 It would be fair to say that
such linkage bargaining does not enjoy a normative justification, though it can
certainly be translated into a kind of political bargaining “game.”21 Worse, if such
bargaining is conducted in a disproportionate manner that provides benefits to
rich countries at the expense of poor countries, it becomes tantamount to the
“launder[ing]” of unilateral pressures by rich and powerful (Western) countries.22
As Alvarez pointedly observes, the result may decidedly seem to be a form of
“neoimperialism” to those in poorer countries.23
Attempts at laundering or the strategic linkage of certain issue areas
espoused by developed countries and the northern nongovernmental
organizations (“NGOs”), such as human rights or labor standards, are often
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23

Id at 36–37.
Id at 51–52.
José E. Alvarez, The WTO as Linkage Machine, 96 Am J Intl L 146, 147 (2002).
David W. Leebron, Linkages, 96 Am J Intl L 5, 12 (2002).
Id at 13.
Alvarez, 96 Am J Intl L at 147 (cited in note 16)
John H. Jackson, Afterword: The Linkage Problem—Comments on Five Texts, 96 Am J Intl L 118, 121
(2002).
See Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, 38 World Pol 25, 45 (1985).
Alvarez, 96 Am J Intl L at 148 (cited in note 16)
Id at 152.
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characterized by a moralistic streak. Moralism is invoked to justify the use of the
WTO’s teeth—in other words, sanctions—in the event of violations of these
norms. However, many developing countries have alleged that the reality behind
such rhetoric, obscured by the moral high ground, amounts to little more than
disguised protectionism. Following this line of argument, Jagdish Bhagwati
observes that forced harmonization toward higher social standards often
originates from “commercial” considerations. That is, the phenomenon is driven
not by altruistic concern for the welfare of people living in developing countries
but by the complaints of producers in rich countries that a lower regulatory
burden on poor country exporters is “unfair.”24 The conflict between these
contrasting positions ultimately raises the issue of the “desirability” of linkage,
which is discussed in the following section.

2. Desirability (Whether to Link)
The demand for linkage often stems from a desire to capitalize on certain
institutional benefits of the WTO, such as its enforcement mechanism, in
addressing nontrade issues, such as labor standards and human rights, when
national regulatory efforts fail to satisfy certain domestic constituencies. In this
regard, the WTO has certainly become a popular “magnet” for social policies,25
“pull[ing] many international lawyers towards international adjudication as the
primary method for linkage.”26 Yet as Leebron points out, this “regime
borrowing” is only a “second-best solution” since it falls short of improving an
unsatisfactory linked regime independently.27 In the same context, Alvarez warns
against the linkage of human rights and trade on the ground that international
human rights law is porous and incomplete, providing, for example, no universal
consensus on the content of material obligations.28 From a different perspective,
Jeffrey Dunoff argues that the “incorporation of other bodies of international
law” into the WTO system may unduly increase the legalization of those other
bodies when such a development is not proper.29
24

25

26

27
28
29

Jagdish Bhagwati, Introduction, in Jagdish Bhagwati and Robert E. Hudec, eds, Fair Trade and
Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade? Vol 1: Economic Analysis 1, 5 (MIT 1996).
Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating the World Trade Organization, 96 Am J Intl L 28, 29 (2002); Sylvia
Ostry, The WTO and International Governance, in Klaus Günter Deutsch and Bernhard Speyer, eds,
The World Trade Organization Millennium Round: Freer Trade in the Twenty-First Century 285, 290, 293
(Routledge 2001).
José E. Alvarez, How Not To Link: Institutional Conundrums of an Expanded Trade Regime, 7 Widener
L Symp J 1, 15 (2001).
Leebron, 96 Am J Intl L at 27 (cited in note 17).
Alvarez, 7 Widener L Symp J at 6 (cited in note 26).
Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The WTO in Transition: Of Constituents, Competence and Coherence, 33 Geo Wash
Intl L Rev 979, 1012 (2001).

632

Vol. 5 No. 2

Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation

Cho

Many other scholars, including economists and legal scholars alike, accept
this negative point of view on linkage for various reasons. Jim Rollo and Alan
Winters observe that enforcing higher labor and environmental standards via
trade sanctions will result in not only the maladministration of those standards
but also the loss of the traditional economic benefits of trade liberalization.30
Frieder Roessler sides with this view by maintaining that linkage will fail to
achieve both trade liberalization and regulatory objectives of linked subjects.31 At
a deeper level, Robert Stern trenchantly observes that the best way to achieve
higher labor standards in developing countries is to open the markets of
developed countries and encourage the economic development of developing
countries.32 Along similar lines, Gregory Shaffer offers the insight that such
linkage efforts will eventually fail in the absence of material financial assistance
to poor countries to help the latter meet the higher regulatory standards
demanded by rich countries.33
In parallel with the critical views described in the preceding paragraph,
most developing countries strongly reject the idea of linkage, mainly due to the
fear of protectionism.34 This allergic reaction by developing countries to any
attempt to link nontrade regulatory issues to trade is in part attributable to the
fact that the Uruguay Round has been implemented in a “strikingly asymmetrical
manner” to the detriment of developing countries.35 For instance, developed
countries have done little to phase out quotas on textiles and clothing as
mandated by the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, while increasingly
pressuring developing countries to implement the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”).36
Nonetheless, some scholars have highlighted the benign effects that linkage
may deliver under certain circumstances. Here, one finds a varying degree of
intensity of such linkage along a wide continuum of perspectives. A modest
30

31

32

33

34

35
36

Jim Rollo and L. Alan Winters, Subsidiarity and Governance Challenges for the WTO: Environmental and
Labor Standards, in Bernard Hoekman and Will Martin, eds, Developing Countries and the WTO: A
Pro-Active Agenda 185, 198–99 (Blackwell 2001).
See Frieder Roessler, Domestic Policy Objectives and the Multilateral Trade Order: Lessons from the Past, 19
U Pa J Intl Econ L 513, 514 (1998).
Robert M. Stern, Labor Standards and Trade, in Marco Bronckers and Reinhard Quick, eds, New
Directions in International Economic Law: Essays in Honor of John H. Jackson 425, 437 (Kluwer 2000).
Gregory Shaffer, WTO Blue-Green Blues: The Impact of U.S. Domestic Politics on Trade-Labor, TradeEnvironment Linkages for the WTO’s Future, 24 Fordham Intl L J 608, 647–48 (2000).
For a well-documented explanation of developing countries’ concern in this issue, see Jose M.
Salazar-Xirinachs, The Trade-Labor Nexus: Developing Countries’ Perspectives, 3 J Intl Econ L 377
(2000).
Dunoff, 33 Geo Wash Intl L Rev at 981 (cited in note 29).
Id.
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approach tends to espouse coexistence of trade and human rights obligations
and acknowledge the need to sensitize the WTO in favor of human rights
protection. Gabrielle Marceau argues that a good faith interpretation of the
WTO treaties should take into account all relevant international law obligations
including human rights, and that there exists a “soft presumption” against
conflicts between trade and human rights obligations.37 However, she opposes
the idea of enforcing human rights obligations through the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism on the grounds of the specificity of WTO rights and
obligations, as well as the “limited jurisdiction” of the WTO panels and the
Appellate Body.38
A more proactive approach endeavors to integrate certain core elements of
human rights obligations within the domain of WTO norms. Sandra Polaski, for
example, observes that developing countries, if they adopt certain minimum
workers’ rights such as the “right to organize unions and bargain over wages,”
can effectively alleviate their poverty and income inequality while improving
their market access to those developed countries that condition market access
upon compliance with minimum labor standards.39 In a similar vein, Virginia
Leary proposes a multilateral approach to the incorporation of social clauses, for
example, fundamental workers’ rights or minimum international labor standards,
into the WTO. Leary’s approach would involve entrusting the International
Labor Organization (“ILO”) with major competences covering the
interpretation of fundamental or minimum international labor standards, and
possible dispute resolution through “fact finding” and “moral persuasion.”40
At the other end of the spectrum, a radical approach attempts to
“constitutionalize” international trade law in the name of human rights. ErnstUlrich Petersmann identifies certain human rights functions in WTO rules, such
as the nondiscrimination principle, and then constitutionalizes them in the
broader terrain of “Global Integration Law.”41 Working from his unique
understanding of EC integration law, Petersmann envisions a “worldwide
integration law” that empowers WTO citizens to retain and exercise their
37
38
39

40

41

Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 13 Eur J Intl L 753, 805 (2002).
Id at 767.
Sandra Polaski, Trade and Labor Standards: A Strategy for Developing Countries 4 (2003), available
online at <http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/Polaski_Trade.asp?from=pubdate> (visited
Nov 10, 2004).
Virginia A. Leary, Workers’ Rights and International Trade: The Social Clause (GATT, ILO, NAFTA,
U.S. Laws), in Bhagwati and Hudec, eds, 2 Fair Trade and Harmonization 177, 223 (cited in note 13).
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations:
Lessons from European Integration Law for Global Integration Law 34–44 (2002) (Jean Monnet Working
Paper No 7/01), available online at <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/
02/021201.html> (visited Nov 10, 2004).
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economic human rights such as freedom to trade, which are indivisible from other
civil and political human rights, both in domestic and international arenas.42
Furthermore, Petersmann argues for “express references” to human rights
protection in WTO Ministerial Declarations or WTO jurisprudence in order to
“enhance a more coherent constitutional discourse and more general awa reness
of the complementary functions of human rights and of global integration
law.”43 His approach has provoked significant criticism from many sides. For
instance, Philip Alston observes that:
this process of human rights-based (or more accurately human rights
justified) ‘constitutionalization’ of the WTO is a highly contentious one.
While it is true that some human rights, and many labour rights, proponents
would like to see a significant role for the Organization in these respects, . . .
they certainly do not see it as an Organization which is designed, structured,
or suitable to operate in the way that one with major human rights
responsibilities would. The Agreement Establishing the WTO is not a
constitutional instrument in the sense of constituting a political or social
community, and its mandate and objectives are narrowly focused around the
goal of ‘expanding the production of and trade in goods and services.’44

In sum, there is as yet no academic consensus on the desirability of linkage.
With respect to human rights, in particular, the issue remains open to further
debate and controversy.

3. Issue Areas (What to Link)
Inseparable from the foregoing discussions of “why to link” and “whether
to link” is the question of “what to link.” Inevitably, discussions surrounding the
former two aspects of linkage are framed in terms of particular subject areas,
such as labor or the environment, on a selective basis. Therefore, one should
always bear in mind this interrelationship among three aspects of linkage when
reviewing the literature on linkage, especially those studies that directly address
the question of “what to link.”
One detects a wide spectrum of opinion in the literature dealing with
linkage in light of the WTO’s accommodating stance on various issue areas.
Making a bold case for a World Economic Organization (“WEO”), Marco
Bronckers rejects the “mono-culture” view of the WTO while promoting a
42
43
44

Id at 13, 30.
Id at 44.
Philip Alston, Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann
30 (2002) (Jean Monnet Working Paper No 12/02), available online at
<http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/02/021201-02.html> (visited Nov 10, 2004)
(emphasis added). See also Robert Howse, Human Rights in the WTO: Whose Rights, What
Humanity?: Comment on Petersmann (2002) (Jean Monnet Working Paper No 12/02), available online
at <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/02/021201-01.html> (visited Nov 10, 2004).
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much broader concept of its potential.45 Working from the philosophical
premise that the WTO could embrace other societal values, such as labor and
environmental protection,46 Bronckers proposes a number of institutional
reforms aimed at achieving “[i]nternal coexistence” between the WTO and side
agreements such as the General Agreement on Trade Services (“GATS”) and
TRIPs as well as “[e]xternal co-operation” with other institutional organizations
such as the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) and ILO for the
purpose of enabling the WTO to effectively address such societal values.47
Other scholars take a more selective approach. Focusing on market access
issues, Kyle Bagwell, Petros Mavroidis, and Robert Staiger advocate broadening
the linkage horizon only to the extent that it includes those regulatory issues that
address “pecuniary externalities,” such as “race-to-the bottom” and “regulatorychill concerns.”48 From a more theoretical and analytical perspective, some
scholars attempt to establish criteria for determining which issue areas should be
brought within the WTO’s domain through linkage. Philip Nichols, for example,
suggests four attributes of a successful candidate for linkage: first, the issue lies
“squarely within the legal competency” of the WTO; second, “the issue is
significant”; third, the WTO is “capable of enforcing any guidelines it issues
concerning the issue; and fourth, that the issue requires international
coordination, and that the [WTO] will provide the optimal coordination.”49
Applying this checklist to the issue of “transnational bribery,” Nichols contends
that the WTO should disseminate guidelines for curbing it.50 Along similar lines,
Steve Charnovitz examines competing ideas and various assumptions about the
rationale of the WTO in the process of formulating a set of criteria (“frames”)
for determining the proper content of the WTO.51 Out of three different
categories (“state-to-state relations,” “domestic politics,” and “international
organization”), Charnovitz introduces eight possible “frames” for deciding
which issues should properly be considered within the domain of the WTO. In
this scheme, the eight “frames” are divided into those dealing with state-to-state
relations (“Cooperative Openness,” “Harmonization,” “Fairness,” and “Risk
Reduction”), those dealing with domestic politics (“Self-Restraint” and
45
46
47
48

49

50
51

See Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, More Power to the WTO?, 4 J Intl Econ L 41, 44 (2001).
Id at 53–56.
Id at 46, 49.
Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis, and Robert W. Staiger, It’s a Question of Market Access, 96 Am J
Intl L 56, 56–57 (2002).
Philip M. Nichols, Corruption in the World Trade Organization: Discerning the Limits of the World Trade
Organization’s Authority, 28 NYU J Intl L & Pol 711, 714 (1996).
Id.
Charnovitz, 96 Am J Intl L at 29–30 (cited in note 25).
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“Coalition Building”), and those dealing with international organization (“Trade
Functionalism” and “Comparative Institutionalism”).52
Finally, a word of caution may be in order for the sake of clarification. The
incorporation of certain areas, such as “services” and “intellectual property
rights,” into the WTO system has often been misconstrued as involving
examples of linkage, as can be seen in the use of phrases such as “trade and
services” or “trade and intellectual property rights.” However, these subject
areas constitute “trade” areas themselves and should be approached as “trade in
services” and “trade in intellectual property rights,” rather than as examples of
linkage. At the same time, it should be understood that independent linkage
problems can and do occur in these areas, for example in the case of “trade and
environment” within the context of GATS.

C. C RITIQUE
This rich literature on linkage has made a major contribution to identifying
this important problem and developing possible solutions. Yet many studies
approach the issue from a “top-down” perspective and consequently fail to
address the normative and institutional realities of the current global trading
system.53 As a result, insufficient attention is paid to microinstitutions that could
be mobilized to address linkage issues. Similarly, normative obstacles to the
realization of the institutional visions set forth in such studies are given short
shrift. While these works may offer significant merits in terms of theorizing and
conceptualizing the linkage issue, they are generally deficient in the area of
practical advice for policymakers and trade negotiators. In this regard, John
Jackson, Jagdish Bhagwati, and Debra Steger have all criticized such studies as
lacking empirical, policy-oriented, and development-oriented perspectives.54
At the same time, a narrow focus on a particular issue area should not be
confused with the kind of empirical, practical perspectives that scholars like
Jackson, Baghwati, and Steger would seem to advocate. To be sure, most
debates on linkage focus on particular issues, such as labor, environment, or
human rights. Perhaps, as Robert Hudec observes, “each author’s particular
contribution inevitably reflects that authors’ professional perspectives.”55
52
53

54

55

Id at 36–54.
See Leebron, 96 Am J Intl L at 5 (cited in note 17); Charnovitz, 96 Am J Intl L at 28 (cited in note
25); Philip M. Nichols, Forgotten Linkages—Historical Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism and
Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 19 U Pa J Intl Econ L 461 (1998).
Jackson, 96 Am J Intl L at 118–19 (cited in note 20); Jagdish Bhagwati, Afterword: The Question of
Linkage, 96 Am J Intl L 126 (2002); Steger, 96 Am J Intl L at 135 (cited in note 10).
Robert E. Hudec, Introduction to the Legal Studies, in Bhagwati and Hudec, eds, 2 Fair Trade and
Harmonization 1, 14 (cited in note 13).
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Although this tendency certainly enriches the debate by adding elements of
specialization and professionalization, it also hinders the development of a
coherent and consistent set of criteria capable of guiding the discussion on
issues of linkage in productive directions. Such scattered narratives on linkage
eventually fail to offer a more genuine understanding of the policy challenges
lurking behind linkage debates. That is, they fail to explain the tension between
trade and nontrade values, as well as its constitutional and evolutionary nature
within the context of the current global trading community.56 Yet a genuine
understanding of these aspects of linkage would provide academics and the
general public alike with a much clearer comprehension of the linkage
phenomenon as a whole. In the absence of such general, policy-based
understanding, it is difficult to explain why certain issues are easier to address
than others under current circumstances. Like in the old saying, it is difficult to
see the forest when one is preoccupied with individual trees.
Put differently, the intensive focus on particular regulatory subjects tends
to push the studies in question toward increasingly extreme points on the
ideological spectrum between laissez-faire and dirigiste economies. Free tradists
tend to oppose the idea of linkage itself, fearing an inundation of regulatory
barriers. By contrast, domestic regulators and certain NGOs tend to advocate
linkage, desiring to capitalize on the high-caliber WTO machinery to further
their particular regulatory visions. The uncompromising nature of the
conventional linkage narratives thus tends to thwart the development of an
eclectic matrix of solutions that would be more feasible in reality. Critically,
linkage is always a matter of degree. The intensity of linkage need not necessarily
be strong, as manifested through trade sanctions, but could be modest, as
observed in various WTO Committees, such as the Committee on Trade and
Environment,57 which engage mainly in research and the exchange of
information.
In theory, a variety of positions could be contrived in this wide spectrum
to effectively reconcile the tension between trade and specific nontrade social
issues. Yet much of the literature proposes solutions in a binary way as a
question of bundled competence. That is, they ask whether the WTO can and
should address labor or environmental issues in their entirety. Whatever their
merits, binary solutions interfere with the development of more subtle
methodologies. One such methodology explored in greater detail below involves
56

57

For general discussion, see Sungjoon Cho, Free Markets and Social Regulation: A Reform Agenda of the
Global Trading System 11–15 (Kluwer 2003).
See World Trade Organization, Work in the Committee on Trade and Environment, available online at
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/wrk_committee_e.htm> (visited Nov 10,
2004).
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approaching the WTO’s institutional apparatus from a functional perspective in
which the General Council, the Appellate Body, and the Committee on Trade
and Environment are each examined in terms of their potential contributions to
resolving the linkage dilemma.
In sum, to understand the true realities underlying the linkage
phenomenon, we should move in a disciplined manner from posing appropriate
questions to exploring a feasible set of solutions in response to those questions.
In particular, it is crucial to recast the linkage question in terms of a tension
between trade and nontrade social values and to contemplate solutions not only
in terms of what to link but more importantly in terms of how to link. The next
two sections will address these challenges in turn.

III. T HE T RUE N ATURE OF L INKAGE : T ENSION BETWEEN
F REE T RADE AND S OCIAL R EGULATION
A. L INKAGE AS A S OURCE OF T ENSION
As discussed above, the real question underlying all linkage issues—be they
trade and health, trade and labor, trade and environment, or trade and human
rights—is the tension between free markets and social regulation. A hypothetical
case may illustrate this tension. Consider the following scenario.
Currently, even a small Mexican toy company can easily gain access to
French consumers via e-commerce. Suppose, however, that the EU suddenly
launches a new directive to ban the importation of products containing an
allegedly toxic substance, which the small Mexican toy company happens to use.
Suppose further that the substance in question is legal under both the Mexican
regulatory regime and the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”)
because no clear scientific evidence has been adduced to prove its potential
harm to children. In this scenario, the global trading system would be caught in a
dilemma. First, if the European ban is allowed to stand, not only Mexican toy
companies, but also most North American toy factories, may lose access to the
European markets. This is a trade failure. On the other hand, to strike the ban in
the name of free trade would force citizens of European countries to endure fear
and anxiety over their children’s health despite the fact that the ban was not
intended to protect certain European industries. Therefore, this is a regulatory
failure. The tension between trade and regulatory failure, which leads to many
such dilemmas, lies at the center of all linkage issues.

B. R EGULATORY G RIEVANCE : R EGULATORY F AILURE
As indicated by their respective appellations, both the GATT 1947
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and the new WTO (World Trade
Organization) have located their primary institutional identity in the disposition
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of trade issues. Thus, the priority of both institutions undoubtedly lies in the
elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers and the improvement of market
access. This is true despite the fact that they have taken into account, in various
ways, social issues inevitably linked to international trade. The most conspicuous
medium through which to address the subject of linkage can be found in the
textual relationship between the General Obligations that represent traditional
trade values, such as GATT Articles I (Most-Favored Nation) and III (National
Treatment), and the General Exceptions that represent certain social values,
such as Article XX. Yet the intensity of such linkage seems rather weak. In other
words, an inherent pro-trade bias, which is evidenced by a dichotomy between
general obligations and exceptions, tends to prevent social values from
prevailing over trade values in practice. Social regulations, such as health and
safety measures, are investigated at an inferior stage as exceptions only after those
measures turn out to be violations of general obligations.
Evidence of this pro-trade bias abounds. First, most social regulations are
easily struck down as violations of the National Treatment obligation because
the regulatory distinction that these regulations create tends inevitably to
discriminate between “like” domestic and foreign products. For example, if the
EU prohibits all production, distribution and marketing of genetically modified
(“GM”) food and accordingly bans foreign imports of GM soybeans, the EU
measure may be found to violate GATT Article III on the theory that it
discriminates between domestic nonGM soybeans and foreign GM soybeans
despite their similar physical characteristics as soybeans. Here, one might argue
that the existence of a different production methodology based on regulatory
compliance should result in a finding of dissimilarity, or “unlikeness,” to the EU
nonGM soybeans. However, the GATT/WTO jurisprudence still maintains a
product-oriented as opposed to process-oriented perspective on the National
Treatment obligation. In other words, soybeans are soybeans no matter how
they are manufactured or processed. To discriminate between these like
products is a violation of the National Treatment obligation.58 In sum, any
disparate impact of a social regulation on domestic and foreign “like products,”
even impact due to legitimate regulatory distinction, results in a violation of
GATT Article III.
Second, the scope of general obligations such as Article III is quite farreaching. Article III:4 is applied to “all laws, regulations and requirements affecting

58

See GATT, Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna ¶¶ 5.9, 5.11–5.12,
DS21/R–39 S/155 (Sept 3, 1991) (cited in note 2). The Tuna panel observed that even an equally
indistinguishable measure, which applies both to imported and like domestic products in an originneutral way, should be product-related in order to be subject to the interpretive note and thus
Article III:4.
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their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or
use.”59 Such sweeping language as “all” and “affecting” tends to subject almost
all social regulations to the discipline of Article III. The resulting situation is
broadly analogous to that implicated by the affecting test in US Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.60
Third, the general exception clause in Article XX, which represents various
social regulations, such as protection of human health and environment, is
incomplete. It is obsolete and deficient because it has not been amended since
its creation in the 1940s. Indeed, certain social policy parameters articulated in
the clause are even “anachronistically narrow,” reflecting the regulatory
sensitivities of the era in which it was drafted,61 rather than those of the twentyfirst century.
Fourth, based on the principle that exceptions should be interpreted
“narrowly,”62 GATT panels have traditionally maintained interpretive rigor when
addressing exceptions. Moreover, in construing whether such exceptions are
“necessary” to achieve putative domestic regulatory goals, panels have devised
draconian tests such as the “least trade restrictive” test, according to which a
defendant (regulating state) must demonstrate that the measure in question is the
least trade restrictive alternative imaginable. This exacting interpretive stance has
undoubtedly discouraged the social concerns embedded in such exceptions from
actually being embraced through GATT jurisprudence. Not surprisingly, not a
single GATT report rendered an affirmative ruling on exceptions.63
Nevertheless, such a sweeping pro-trade bias could not be sustained against
the recent winds of change. First, domestic regulations have begun to receive
greater attention. A great many domestic regulations have been issued in
response to the popular demands of the welfare state and the novel risks
associated with the creation of modern technology. Second, traditional trade
policy measures—such as tariffs and quotas—have begun to vanish partly
59
60

61

62

63

GATT 1947, art III:4 at 490 (cited in note 1).
Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US 1, 195 (1824). See Norman R. Williams, Gibbons, 79 NYU L Rev 1398,
1415 (2004).
I owe this insight to Professor Joseph H. H. Weiler. See also Mike Meier, GATT, WTO, and the
Environment: To What Extent Do GATT/WTO Rules Permit Member Nations to Protect the Environment
When Doing So Adversely Affects Trade?, 8 Colo J Intl Envir L & Poly 241, 281 (1997) (contending
that the old GATT is a “relic of 1947, when economic development was the priority”).
See G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade
Organization, 44 Duke L J 829, 906 n 349 (1995).
See Robert Howse, Managing the Interface between International Trade Law and the Regulatory State: What
Lessons Should (and Should Not) Be Drawn from the Jurisprudence of the United States Dormant Commerce
Clause, in Thomas Cottier, Petros C. Mavroidis and Patrick Blatter, eds, Regulatory Barriers and the
Principle of Non-Discrimination in World Trade Law 139, 142 (Michigan 2000).
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because tariffs have already been lowered dramatically, and partly because
governments have realized that the protection of certain domestic industries
tends to be very costly, often harming the economic interests of their own
citizens. Under these new circumstances, the original pro-trade bias, if left
unchanged, would have failed to properly address the new status quo, thereby
delegitimating the global trading system.
In this connection, numerous critics have raised their voices against the
current inability of the WTO to tackle these contemporary problems. Philip
Nichols, for example, criticizes the deficiency of GATT Article XX exceptions
and warns that the failure to represent the “fundamental nature of societal
values,” such as labor, environment, and cultural identity, deprives the WTO of
legitimacy.64 Nichols goes on to argue for creating an exception, in addition to
Article XX, to embrace such societal values.65 From a slightly different
perspective, Jeffrey Dunoff contends that WTO panels should not engage in any
“trade and . . .” issues by exercising judicial caution because their decisions risk
delegitimating the WTO as a whole due to its embedded pro-trade bias.66 Some
scholars view the WTO as an improper venue for the arbitration of social
regulations because it lacks necessary resources such as institutional and
technical expertise.67 In a parallel line, Michael Trebilcock and Robert Howse
argue that “substantial national political autonomy” should be ensured in the
domestic regulatory process even if those regulations will affect trade flows.68
In sum, the ever increasing magnitude of social regulations in the modern
welfare state tends to result in a perpetual cycle of angst and grievance in the
face of the inherent pro-trade bias of the WTO and consequent incapacity of the
WTO system to treat social regulations in an appropriate way. In the absence of
serious efforts to incorporate due “sensitivity” to legitimate social regulatory
concerns, the legitimacy of the WTO cannot be ensured.69

64
65
66

67

68

69

See Philip M. Nichols, Trade without Values, 90 Nw U L Rev 658, 660 (1996).
Id.
See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Death of the Trade Regime, 10 Eur J Intl L 733, 754–57 (1999). But see
Hannes L. Schloemann and Stefan Ohlhoff, “Constitutionalization” and Dispute Settlement in the WTO:
National Security as an Issue of Competence, 93 Am J Intl L 424, 451 (1999) (arguing that the WTO’s
ability to overcome a “protrade bias” through the incorporation of necessary policy elements will
be critical to its constitutionalization).
See David A. Wirth, International Trade Agreements: Vehicles for Regulatory Reform?, 1997 U Chi Legal F
331; David A. Wirth, The Role of Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade Disciplines, 27
Cornell Intl L J 817, 859 (1994) (maintaining that the WTO panels should be “highly deferential”
to the scientific determinations of national regulatory agencies).
Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse, Trade Liberalization and Regulatory Diversity: Reconciling
Competitive Markets with Competitive Politics, 6 Eur J L & Econ 5, 28 (1998).
See Daniel C. Esty, The World Trade Organization’s Legitimacy Crisis, 1 World Trade Rev 7, 19 (2002).
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C. T HE D EMISE OF F REE T RADE : 70 T RADE F AILURE
When confronting a legitimate regulatory concern, one might reasonably
posit that domestic governments should be able to maintain their own regulatory
autonomy and diversity. In other words, domestic regulations should be fully
respected as long as they stand for legitimate objectives and are not
protectionist. An intransigent adherence to one’s own national standards,
however, particularly when they are unique or idiosyncratic, often gives rise to a
de facto form of protectionism. Where national standards have been established
for a long time or were developed in an atmosphere of consultation with
affected domestic companies, those companies are naturally at an advantage visà-vis competing foreign exporters in terms of compliance with those standards.
Yet it is difficult to distinguish in practice between the unavoidable advantages
accruing to domestic industries with respect to national standards and
deliberately-designed, disguised forms of protectionism.71
Accordingly, unless regulatory diversity or regulatory heterogeneity is
tolerated by importing countries72 or endorsed between importing and exporting
countries through relevant legal instruments such as mutual recognition,
importing countries would ban the import of those products that fail to comply
with their own national standards. Under such circumstances, regulatory
70

71

72

For the purpose of this article, free trade can be defined as nondiscrimination including not only
antiprotectionism but also a status without any unjustifiable disparate impact. David Driesen warns
that the lack of a clear legal conceptualization of “free trade” can undermine the legitimacy of the
global trading system, and identifies three different notions of free trade: “non-discrimination,”
“international non-coercion,” and “principle of laissez-faire government.” David M. Driesen,
What Is Free Trade?: The Real Issue Lurking behind the Trade and Environment Debate, 41 Va J Intl L 279,
285 (2001). Driesen observes that because of the different nuances, ramifications, and “normative
attractiveness” that these three notions of free trade deliver in different contexts, defining free
trade seems to be a fluid task—a task akin to the “Rorschach” test. Id at 285.
See Jackson, 96 Am J Intl L at 125 (cited in note 20); WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, General
Agreement on Trade in Services, art XVII, ¶ 1 n 10, in The Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts 325, 342 (cited in note 1) (stating that “inherent
competitive disadvantages which result from the foreign character of the relevant services or service
suppliers”).
Bhagwati comprehensively surveyed the demands to reduce regulatory diversity among trading
nations. Jagdish Bhagwati, The Demands to Reduce Domestic Diversity among Trading Nations, in
Bhagwati and Hudec, eds, 1 Fair Trade and Harmonization at 9 (cited in note 24). From a
philosophical viewpoint, he offered three explanations: “transborder obligations,” “distributive
justice,” and “fairness.” Id at 9–20. Structurally speaking, “diminished giant syndrome” and
“globalization” are factors that he considers. Id at 20–23. From an economic viewpoint, he
highlighted that most preeminent economists observe that mutual gains from trade can still occur
without harmonization of social regulation. Id at 23–31. From a political viewpoint, he found
such demands in the law of “constant protection” clad with the “unfair trade” argument which
emerged after the decline of traditional protectionist devices such as tariffs and quotas. Id at 31–
35.
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diversity or regulatory heterogeneity is itself a source of trade barriers in the
global dimension. Moreover, the trade-restrictive nature of domestic regulations
tends only to intensify as national economies become more interdependent. To
be sure, certain large multinational enterprises might be able to survive such
regulatory heterogeneity by using economies of scale flowing from a vast global
market share to implement multiple production lines. Yet most small and
medium-sized enterprises cannot afford such luxuries. From the perspective of
these smaller players, the above scenario eventuates a high degree of economic
concentration and a corresponding massive income disparity on a global scale.
This situation becomes more vivid still if the exporters are developing
countries and the importers are developed countries with higher regulatory
standards. Developing countries suffer from these higher standards mainly
because they lack the financial and technical capability to meet highly
sophisticated standards. Under these circumstances, nothing is gained from
saddling developing countries with rich country standards. Still, some may argue
for “fair” trade or a “level playing field” from the perspective of domestic
industries in rich countries that claim to be unfairly disadvantaged when forced
to comply with domestic standards from which foreign competitors are
exempt.73 Similarly, some may warn against a theoretical “race to the bottom” or
“social dumping” by which noncompliant products from developing countries
trigger a downward competition for lower production costs among industries
that eventually results in a deterioration of the general quality of regulatory
protection.74 Yet to this date no significant empirical evidence has been
produced to prove the existence of such theoretical phenomena.75
73

74

75

But see Jagdish Bhagwati, A Stream of Windows: Unsettling Reflections on Trade, Immigration and
Democracy 247–68 (MIT 1998) (discussing why leveling the field is unfair in terms of comparative
advantage).
See Philip M. Nichols, GATT Doctrine, Va J Intl L 379, 464 (1996) (observing that “[t]o the extent
the World Trade Organization translates GATT doctrine into a rigidity that consistently exalts
trade above all other societal values, it could seriously undermine the free trade regime’s popular
acceptance”).
See, for example, John Douglas Wilson, Capital Mobility and Environmental Standards: Is There a
Theoretical Basis for a Race to the Bottom?, in Bhagwati and Hudec, eds, 1 Fair Trade and Harmonization
393, 423 (cited in note 24) (observing that a “race” is not a representative word depicting
behaviors of independent governments and that this race model fails to explain the absence of
more direct means to attract foreign firms such as subsidies or lower tax rate on capital gains);
Arik Levinson, Environmental Regulations and Industrial Location: International and Domestic Evidence, in
Bhagwati and Hudec, eds, 1 Fair Trade and Harmonization 429, 453 (cited in note 24) (emphasizing
the lack of economic evidence to support that “environmental regulations harm competit[ion]”).
See also Bhagwati, 96 Am J Intl L at 130–31 (cited in note 54); Adrienne Héritier, Christoph
Knill, and Susanne Mingers, Ringing the Changes in Europe: Regulatory Competition and the Transformation
of the State. Britain, France, Germany 1 (Walter de Gruyter 1996) (finding that “European clean-air
policy is the product of regulative contest between leading member states”); David Vogel, Trading
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Moreover, under the principle of comparative advantage, producers in rich
countries have a much easier time complying with higher regulatory standards
than do their counterparts in poor countries since the former enjoy higher levels
of technology. At the same time, a perennial grievance of companies in
developed countries—cheap imports—is less a function of the relatively higher
compliance costs borne by producers in rich countries than of the lower labor
costs enjoyed by producers in poor countries. This, too, seems natural according
to the principle of comparative advantage.76 To resolve this dilemma, serious and
sustained efforts to build the capacity of poor countries to effectively comply
with higher social standards are required. This can be accomplished via financial
and technical assistance from rich countries. In the absence of such intervention,
regulatory unilateralism works to undermine free trade in the form of either
further protectionism77 or development failure.

D. B EYOND THE E NTROPIC D ILEMMA
At first glance, the foregoing tension between regulatory grievances
(regulatory failure) and free trade concerns (trade failure) inevitably poses a
profound dilemma: if one value is promoted too forcefully, any resulting
benefits are likely to come at the expense of the other value. Indeed, the
conventional approach to linkage has been negative, as symbolized by the use of
such terms as “clash” or “conflict.”78 This negative perspective often leads to a
“dialogue of the deaf” framed in terms such as “[f]ree trade versus labor
standards” or “growth versus the environment.”79 The predictable result is at
best a zero-sum reconciliation in which trade and nontrade values cancel or
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Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy 6 (Harvard 1995) (discussing the socalled “California effect,” which is an example of a “race to the top”).
See David W. Leebron, Lying Down with Procrustes: An Analysis of Harmonization Claims, in Bhagwati
and Hudec, eds, 1 Fair Trade and Harmonization 41, 71 (cited in note 24) (observing that
“[d]ifferences in legal and policy regimes that result from differences in preferences, endowments,
or technologies reflect differences in the optimal regime” and that “[a]ny claim of unfairness
would seem fundamentally at odds with not only with the theory of comparative advantage, but
also with a minimalist notion of sovereignty that allowed each nation to adopt policies that are
best for it”).
Regarding the so-called “green protectionism,” see World Trade Organization, Environment: History
1, Early Years: emerging environment debate in GATT/WTO, available online at
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/hist1_e.htm> (visited Nov 10, 2004).
See Cho, Free Markets and Social Regulation at 44–45 (cited in note 56) (discussing a dilemma of
“dual crisis”).
Renato Ruggiero, A Shared Responsibility: Global Policy Coherence for Our Global Age, Address to the
Conference on “Globalization as a Challenge for German Business; export opportunities for small and mediumsized companies in the environmental field (Dec 9, 1997), available online at <http://www.wto.org/
english/news_e/sprr_e/bonn_e.htm> (visited Nov 10, 2004).
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offset each other under clashing or conflicting circumstances. Against the
backdrop of expanding interdependency upon the contemporary international
trade landscape, such zero-sum effects, if allowed to become widespread, will
undermine the global trading system by greatly reducing the net value added.
It follows that the global trading community should take the more
constructive step of adopting a positive perspective on linkage in order to
transform international trade into a positive sum game. As the former WTO
Director-General Renato Ruggiero maintains, economic growth powered by
international trade leads to better social conditions.80 On the other hand,
regulatory improvement tends to boost international trade through the economy
of standardization or better “market contestability.”81
In this regard, the global trading system has come to require a new telos
capable of transcending the narrow purpose of antiprotection while at the same
time connoting a much broader ideal of “integration” that ensures that both
trade values and social values are upheld in a coherent and synergetic, rather
than competing fashion.82 Reflecting this new teleology, the Preamble of the
WTO Charter expresses the ideals of an “integrated, more viable and durable
multilateral trading system” and “sustainable development,”83 which certainly go
beyond the narrow antiprotectionist motto that was embedded in the old
GATT. In the same context, the Doha Ministerial Declaration recently
reaffirmed the Members’ commitment to the objective of “sustainable
development” under which a dual goal of open markets and adequate social
regulation must be “mutually supportive.”84
Naturally, this new telos necessitates strengthening the free trade/social
regulation linkage, which has hitherto been limited by the inherent pro-trade bias
of the key structures and institutions, and mandates the development of more
practical problem-solving attitudes in pursuit of the dual goals of free markets
and desired social regulation. This daunting task must rely for its achievement
not only on jurisprudence but also on institutional instruments including, but
80
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Renato Ruggiero, Beyond the Multilateral Trading System, Address to the 20th Seminar on International
Security, Politics and Economics Institut pour les Hautes Etudes Internationales (Apr 12, 1999), available
online at <http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sprr_e/ih_e.htm> (visited Nov 10, 2004).
Compare Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, The International Contestability
of Market–Economic Perspective: Issue Paper, TD/TC(96)5 (1996), with Geza Feketekuty, The Scope,
Implication and Economic Rationale of a Competition-Oriented Approach to Future Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, in Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, TD/TC(96)9, 2–4
(1996).
See Cho, Free Markets and Social Regulation at 13–14 (cited in note 56).
WTO Agreement, preamble, at 6 (cited in note 4).
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration: The Fourth WTO Ministerial Meeting ¶ 6,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov 20, 2001).
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not limited, to the WTO.85 Inevitably, this process will involve a complicated
mix of law, politics, and policies as well as the subtle allocation of powers
exercised by different entities, including national governments and international
institutions such as the WTO.86 This “trade constitution,”87 which is embedded
in the very concept of linkage, also reveals a new horizon in the field of
international trade: “distributional issues.”88 As seen in the experience of the EU,
the effective implementation of a common social policy in a given polity, while
minimizing any negative effect to trade, requires some kind of financial
assistance mechanism, such as a “structural fund,” to aid less developed
members to equip themselves with higher regulatory standards.89
85
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But see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Reconciling International Trade with Preservation of the Global Commons: Can
We Prosper and Protect?, 49 Wash & Lee L Rev 1407, 1421–38, 1441–50 (1992) (arguing that
scholars should first focus on conflicting interests, such as “economic efficiency,” “sovereignty”
and “political harmony,” underlying the trade and environment linkage before contemplating any
institutional solution, and presenting a set of legal doctrines balancing these interests, such as
“non-discrimination,” “proportionality,” and “relatedness”).
Jackson, 96 Am J Intl L at 118 (cited in note 20). Compare Joel P. Trachtman, Institutional Linkage:
Transcending “Trade and . . .”, 96 Am J Intl L 77, 80 (2002) (discussing “allocation of jurisdiction”).
John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations 339 (MIT
2d ed 1997); John H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence 101–04
(Royal Inst Intl Aff 1998); John H. Jackson, Reflections on International Economic Law, 17 U Pa J Intl
Econ L 17, 25–28 (1996); John H. Jackson, Perspectives on Regionalism in Trade Relations, 27 L & Pol
in Intl Bus 873 (1996). See also Antonio F. Perez, WTO and U.N. Law: Institutional Comity in
National Security, 23 Yale J Intl L 301, 316–24 (1998) (discussing Professor Jackson’s constitutional
premise of international trade law). Compare Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Agenda for the
WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 Pac Rim L & Poly J 1, 32, 35 (1995) (submitting a
“targeted constitutional approach” in the trade/competition linkage under which nations retain
the rights to “formulate and interpret” their own anticompetition laws but are subject to a certain
international dispute resolution system when disputes “cannot be resolved in national courts or by
the nations themselves”); James Thuo Gathii, Re-Characterizing the Social in the Constitutionalization of
the WTO: A Preliminary Analysis, 7 Widener L Symp J 137 (2001). Although Gathii succeeds to
“characterize” nontrade, social values as coexisting with trade values, his “preliminary analysis”
fails to deliver further details on how to achieve this coexistence. Id at 173. Furthermore, he
makes a fatal flaw in his analysis by equating protectionism embedded in the antidumping
mechanism or the voluntary export restraints with avenues through which social issues can be
addressed. See id at 170–72. Safeguard measures are the only legitimate trade-restricting avenue to
address, temporarily and exceptionally, any social instability (dislocation and bankruptcy) caused
by free trade in an unforeseeable way. Otherwise, it is each government’s job to cushion the
impact of free trade using domestic, not trade, policies such as tax or adjustment programs.
See Dunoff, 33 Geo Wash Intl L Rev at 1008 (cited in note 29).
See William P. Alford, Introduction: The North American Free Trade Agreement and the Need for Candor,
34 Harv Intl L J 293, 297 (1993) (observing that “substantial transfer payments” from developed
to developing countries are necessary for the latter to implement higher regulatory standards).
Compare Frank J. Garcia, Trade and Justice: Linking the Trade Linkage Debates, 19 U Pa J Intl Econ L
391, 414–15 (1998) (observing, based on the premise that all linkage issues are “inescapably moral
questions” since they are questions of “justice,” that solutions to the linkage issues depend on the
“allocation of social goods and social burdens”).
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Importantly, just as no constitution is static, this “trade constitution” is not
limited in its operation by a priori restraints or predetermined competence limits
of the type that would oblige the WTO to avoid engagement in certain issue
areas.90 In fact, the “boundaries” of international organizations have always been
flexible.91 This is especially so wherever one encounters an international
organization with an evolving telos. Taken to an extreme, emphasis on flexibility
could lead some to conclude that the mandate of the WTO should be expanded
to cover such areas as labor and the environment, thereby institutionalizing an
inseparable relationship between trade and social values.92 Following this line of
thought, some scholars argue for greater horizontality and seamlessness in rule
design in international economic law.93 Yet, the WTO is a trade organization, and
it should reconcile and manage the tension between free markets and social
regulations from the standpoint of a trade organization. Of course, this premise
is by no means to maintain or revive the pro-trade bias in terms of reconciliation
or management of the tension. Rather, it means that the WTO should contribute
to the constructive harmonization of trade and social values without losing its
institutional identity and capacity as a trade organization, while leaving adequate
room for cooperation with other sector-specific international regulatory agencies
such as the International Labor Organization (“ILO”) and the United Nations
Environmental Program (“UNEP”).94
In sum, international trade law defines linkage as “trade and labor” or
“trade and environment,” not as “labor and trade” or “environment and trade,”
respectively.95 International trade law cannot share the same basis with the
90
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Jackson, 96 Am J Intl L at 120–22 (cited in note 20).
Alvarez, 96 Am J Intl L at 149 (cited in note 16). Compare Peter M. Haas and Ernst B. Haas,
Learning to Learn: Some Thoughts on Improving International Governance of the Global Problematique, in
Ingvar Carlsson and Shridath Rampal, Issues in Global Governance: Papers Written for the Commission on
Global Governance 295, 314 (Kluwer 1995) (introducing the concept of the “learning” international
organization, which “redefine[s] [its] missions in light of new interdependencies”); Charnovitz, 96
Am J Intl L at 53 (cited in note 25).
See Garcia, 19 U Pa J Intl Econ L at 425 (cited in note 89) (discussing “Integrated View”); Gathii,
7 Widener L Symp J at 137–38 (cited in note 87); Bronckers, 4 J Intl Econ L at 53–56 (cited in
note 45).
See Pierre Sauvé and Americo Beviglia Zampetti, Subsidiarity Perspectives on the New Trade Agenda, 3 J
Intl Econ L 83, 104 (2000).
See Bronckers, 4 J Intl Econ L at 49–53 (cited in note 45) (discussing “external co-operation”
between the WTO and specialized international regulatory agencies such as the ILO). Compare
Georg Schwarzenberger, The Frontiers of International Law 306 (Stevens and Sons 1962) (insightfully
observing that international cooperation in diverse economic and social issues tends to necessitate
an “expansion in existing international institutions and the creation of new agencies”).
But see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, From Green to Global: Toward the Transformation of International
Environmental Law, 19 Harv Envtl L Rev 241, 281–88 (1995) (exploring various linkage issues from
the standpoint of international environmental law).
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UNEP or ILO even when the WTO addresses putative linkage issues. To ignore
its own institutional identity would be politically fatal and practically ineffective.
After all, the WTO is not, and should not try to become, a form of World
Government of the sort that might arguably be in a better position to fully
federalize linkage issues.

IV. T OWARD A S YNERGISTIC L INKAGE : A M ULTIFACETED
A PPROACH
A. L INKAGE C ONTINUUM
Any credible attempt to achieve a synergistic linkage from the standpoint
of the WTO must proceed from the realization that the linkage phenomenon is
in most cases a matter of degree and that the way in which it is addressed should
accordingly be understood not as a binary choice but as a spectrum of options. As
discussed above, an antinomian stance toward either extreme, in other words,
free trade versus regulatory unilateralism, would continue to create unnecessary
tensions out of linkage, instead of mitigating or eliminating them.
Linkage can be achieved in many different ways, as circumstances merit.
For instance, although GM food has recently commanded enormous legal and
political attention within the global trading system, this linkage of trade and
human health (or the environment) can be handled from totally different
perspectives with totally different results. As the US has recently sued the EU
for the latter’s highly controversial moratorium on the approval of GM food,
this controversy may end up being adjudicated in the WTO dispute settlement
system.96 Alternatively, under a more constructive atmosphere a certain guideline
as to administration and marketing of GM food could be issued to Members as a
result of a joint effort by the Committee on Trade and Environment and the
Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. Similarly, this issue could be
discussed and deliberated in a functional and professional fashion under a
surveillance mechanism such as the Trade Policy Review Mechanism
(“TPRM”).97 Or, in a much bolder though as yet implausible move, the WTO
Members could agree on a new side agreement concerning this issue in
cooperation with the World Health Organization or the United Nation
Environmental Program. In each scenario, one can perceive a wide spectrum of
options yielding varying degrees of trade and environmental protection.
96

97

See Response of the United States to the Questions by the Panel Pertaining to the Request of the
European Communities for a Preliminary Ruling, European Communities–Measures Affecting the
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WTO Doc No WT/DS291/23 (Mar 29, 2003).
See WTO Agreement, Annex 3, Trade Policy Review Mechanism, in The Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts 434 (cited in note 1) (hereinafter TPRM).
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Critically, a different matrix of legal, political, and institutional stakes is
employed in each scenario, and it is this subtle matrix of interests that ultimately
determines the final destiny of the linkage in each particular scenario.
Admittedly, political stakes rank very high in any linkage matrix.98 Joel
Trachtman, for example, regards the decision to link trade to other issues as
essentially political.99 According to this view, law or economics should play
supplementary roles in demonstrating various possibilities and consequences
that each linkage might bring.100 In the final stage, individuals and states should
decide the issue through a political process consisting of the assessment of
different scenarios and the expression of competing preferences.101 According to
this view, linkage problems should ultimately be addressed through such
legislative measures as treaties or agreements.102 At the same time, however,
many other tools and fora exist in the global trading system that are not
necessarily political in themselves but are nonetheless capable of providing
practical and functional solutions to linkage-related issues. For example, certain
aspects of trade and environment linkage have been addressed via the
GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism not in a political but in a (quasi-)
judicial manner.103 Or, a variety of epistemic committees and similar avenues
under the auspices of international institutions could explore linkage issues in an
apolitical and functional fashion, thereby providing policymakers whose
everyday regulatory decisions are based on linkage considerations with
opportunities for the exchange of information and professional deliberation.104
98

99
100
101
102

103

104

See Steger, 96 Am J Intl L at 135 (cited in note 10); Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy—
And Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 Am J Intl L 94, 116–17 (2002);
Charnovitz, 96 Am J Intl L at 30 (cited in note 25); Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the
WTO, 45 Harv Intl L J 303, 307–08 (2004); Chantal Thomas, Should the World Trade Organization
Incorporate Labor and Environmental Standards?, 61 Wash & Lee L Rev 347, 388–91 (2004).
Trachtman, 96 Am J Intl L at 77 (cited in note 86).
Id.
Id.
See, for example, Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future (Inst for Intl
Econ 1994) (arguing for the establishment of a new international environmental organization);
Dunoff, 19 Harv Envir L Rev at 257 (cited in note 95) (espousing such organization for different
reasons). But see Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization under Challenge: Democracy and the
Law and Politics and of the WTO’s Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, 25 Harv Envir L Rev 1,
84–93 (2001) (viewing the creation of such organization as ineffective on the ground that it would
still fail to address disparities between and within the US and the EU).
See GATT Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R - 39 S/155
(Sept 3, 1991) (cited in note 2); World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United
States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc No WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr
29, 1996); World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc No WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct 12, 1998).
See Subsection IV.A.4 in this Article.
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B. M ULTIFACETED L IST OF O PTIONS
1. Jurisprudence
The well-developed dispute settlement mechanism that has been operating
since the birth of the old GATT 1947 is one of the main engines for addressing
linkages. As Daniel Farber and Robert Hudec observe, GATT can offer fairly
“workable” solutions in reconciling the tension between trade and social
concerns such as environmental protection by distinguishing “bona fide
regulation” from “protectionism.”105 Panels and the Appellate Body have
engaged in the adjudication of numerous cases at the intersection of trade and
social regulations. Most of these cases involve various social regulations relating
to health or environmental concerns that result in some type of incidental
restriction on international trade. Therefore, the analysis of panels (or the
Appellate Body) centers on the interpretation of general obligations that
enshrine free trade, such as Articles I (Most-Favored Nation), III (National
Treatment) and XI (Market Access), as well as exceptions that represent certain
overriding social values, such as Article XX (General Exception).
Yet in the old GATT era, when a pro-trade bias was clearly evident, panels
focused on the “content” of a given domestic regulation in their judicial review.
This often resulted in a presumptive conclusion that the measure in question
was not “necessary” or even rationally “related” to the attainment of the social
values of the regulating state. This second-guessing or negation of legitimate
policy objectives often infuriated domestic policymakers and thus diminished
their perception of GATT’s legitimacy. For instance, a panel struck down the
Thai government’s ban on the importation of foreign cigarettes despite its
legitimate health concerns, which even the WHO supported, on the sole ground
that a more trade-friendly solution theoretically could have been found.106
However, under the new WTO system the Appellate Body has directed its
interpretive focus to the “manner” in which a given domestic regulation is
applied, and not to the regulation’s substance. In its jurisprudence, the Appellate
Body has tried to scrutinize on a case-by-case basis whether a given domestic
regulation was applied consistently and evenhandedly or whether it respected
fundamental principles of law, rather than reinvestigating, on its own accord,
whether the regulation’s substance was necessary or related to the achievement
105

106

Daniel A. Farber and Robert E. Hudec, GATT Legal Restraints on Domestic Environmental Regulations,
in Bhagwati and Hudec, eds, 2 Fair Trade and Harmonization 59, 80–85 (cited in note 13).
GATT, Report of the Panel, Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes ¶¶
52–53, 55–56, GATT BISD DS10/R–37S/200 (Nov 7, 1990). See David P. Fidler, Neither Science
Nor Shamans: Globalization of Markets and Health in the Developing World, 7 Ind J Global Legal Studies
191, 200–01 (1999) (criticizing the Thai Cigarette panel report).
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of the regulating state’s social policy goals. In fact, Farber and Hudec predicted
with brilliant insight that future debates on linkage should prioritize regulatory
processes over substantive regulations themselves because a “clean doctrinal
solution” tends to be hard to achieve in the face of sophisticated regulations
positioned along a wide spectrum of legitimate and protectionist objectives.107
Thus, in United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline
(“Gasoline”), the Appellate Body upheld the legitimacy of the US environmental
policy toward clean air, but condemned its lack of effort during the regulatory
process to reduce administrative requirements that resulted in a heavier
compliance burden for foreign refiners.108 Likewise, in the famed United States—
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (“Shrimp-Turtle”) case, the
Appellate Body sympathized with the regulatory goals of US Section 609109 (in
other words, protection of endangered species such as sea turtles), but criticized
flaws in its implementation process, such as the denial of due process, that
ultimately hurt foreign shrimpers.110 The result of this new test was to safeguard
the Members’ regulatory autonomy by providing ample regulatory leeway for
domestic regulators. Under this new test, even if a measure turned out to be a
violation, the outcome was not catastrophic but merely suspensive or
provisional, demanding only a change of application, rather than repeal of the
offending statute. When the US lost the Shrimp-Turtle case, for example, it was
not forced to change its domestic statute, Section 609, but only its application.111
This invention of a new doctrinal test, which constitutes further evidence
of the transformation of the telos of the global trading system,112 is premised on
the chapeau of Article XX. The text of the chapeau is vague, consisting of
nonspecific terms such as “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” and
“disguised restriction.” Under the old GATT, this preambular text attracted little
attention, resulting in a minimal amount of case law that was limited to

107
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109
110

111
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Farber and Hudec, GATT Legal Restraints on Domestic Environmental Regulations at 85 (cited in note
105).
World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline 27, WTO Doc No WT/DS2/9 (May 20, 1996).
Pub L No 101-161, codified at 16 USC § 1537 (1994).
World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products ¶ 181, WTO Doc No WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct 12, 1998) (cited in
note 103).
USTR, Press Release: WTO Appellate Body Found US Sea Turtle Law Meets WTO Criteria But Faults US
Implementation (Oct 12, 1998) (emphasizing that the US law (Section 609) had been left intact by
the Report).
Cho, Free Markets and Social Regulation at 12–15 (cited in note 56).
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expounding its lexicographical meaning.113 Yet the Appellate Body, through its
teleological creation of a new doctrinal test, managed to invest the text with new
meaning. This judicial innovation holds significant implications for the linkage
debate. Most importantly, its “process-oriented” hermeneutics results in the
creation of a synergistic space in which both trade and social values can be
simultaneously upheld.114
As significant as it may be from the perspective of linkage theory, the
Appellate Body’s teleological interpretation is applicable only when a particular
domestic regulation falls within the rubric of the “exhaustive” list contained in
Article XX. As mentioned above, this list is incomplete and even anachronistic.
A number of significant modern regulatory concerns such as consumer
protection, labor, or anticompetition do not appear on the list. Consequently,
the question is whether panels or the Appellate Body should accept for review
cases involving regulations not expressly covered by the GATT/WTO, such as
those regarding labor and consumer protection. From a judicial standpoint,
certain methods can be conceived whereby interventions in such cases can be
justified.
The first method involves returning to Article III and redeeming legitimate
social regulations before they are justified under Article XX. In other words, if a
certain regulation is nonprotectionist and thus legitimate, it can be deemed
consistent with Article III in the first instance. This approach, which is dubbed
the “aim and effect” test,115 was implicated in the recent debate on PPMs.116 The

113

114

115

116

Under the GATT, very few cases involved the chapeau. See General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (Organization), Guide to GATT Law and Practice: Analytical Index 563–65 (Geneva 6th ed
1994).
McGinnis and Movsesian also advocate the use of “procedure-oriented” jurisprudence
highlighting “transparency,” “performance-orientation,” and “consistency” but only to the extent
that it strikes down covertly protectionist measures and eventually realizes a Madisonian vision of
democracy. John O. McGinnis and Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 Harv L
Rev 511, 573–83 (2000). See also Deborah Z. Cass, The ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade
Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade, 12 Eur J
Intl L 39 (2001) (arguing that the WTO tribunal engages in “judicial constitutionalization” by
generating in its jurisprudence “constitutional-type norms and structures”).
See Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an “Aim and
Effects” Test, 32 Intl Law 619 (1998). See also GATT, Report of the Panel, United States—Taxes on
Automobiles ¶ 5.10, WTO Doc No DS31/R (Oct 11, 1994); GATT, Report of the Panel, United
States—Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverage ¶¶ 5.71–5.72, WTO Doc No DS23/R, GATT
BISD (39S/206) (June 19, 1992); World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body,
European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas ¶ 216, WTO Doc
No WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept 9, 1997) (ruling against the “aim and effect” test).
See, for example, Steve Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO: Debunking the
Myth of Illegality, 27 Yale J Intl L 59 (2002); Robert Howse and Donald Regan, The Product/Process
Distinction—An Illusory Basis for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy, 11 Eur J Intl L 249 (2000);
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term PPM, for “Processes and Production Method,” stands for a variety of
regulations concerning the way in which products are manufactured or
processed.117 Under conventional trade rules, most PPMs constitute prima facie
violations of Article III because they discriminate between similar products on
the basis of regulatory compliance. For example, a domestic regulation banning
the importation of pelts from animals caught in leg-hold traps—which could be
regarded as cruel—would constitute a violation of the National Treatment
obligation because the ban discriminates between foreign leg-hold pelts and
domestic non-leg-hold pelts.118 Because the protection of animal welfare is not
found in Article XX, such regulations cannot be justified under a strict reading
of Article XX. Even if such a regulation were justified under Article XX, critics
argue that such a justification doctrine would impose an “unwarranted legal
burden” on the achievement of legitimate social values, since the regulation in
question was justified only after being condemned as a violation of Article III.
Therefore, such critics contend that regulatory distinctions grounded in
legitimate policy objectives should be found to be consistent with Article III
without any further need for Exception Clause analysis.
Admittedly, advocates of PPMs may earn plaudits among certain
constituencies for defying the pro-trade bias resulting from the dichotomy
between the general obligations and exceptions embedded in GATT. To them,
any legitimate social concern should be accorded a status equal to that of trade
concerns by being redeemed in the first instance—at the level of Article III
analysis—without the stigma associated with violation and redemption at the
inferior stage of exceptionization. Yet the flaw in this argument is that if PPMs
are allowed to go unchecked, the proliferation of regulatory protectionism and
unilateralism is likely to follow.119 Put simply, it is far too easy for idiosyncratic
regulations, even where they are nonprotectionist in intent, to create trade
barriers, unless they are subjected to the doctrinal discipline of Article XX.120
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119

120

John H. Jackson, Comments on Shrimp/Turtle and the Product/Process Distinction, 11 Eur J Intl L 303
(2000).
See OECD, Processes and Production Methods (PPMs): Conceptual Framework and Considerations on Use of
PPM-Based Trade Measures, available online at <http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/1997doc.nsf/
linkto/ocde-gd(97)137> (visited Nov 10, 2004).
For a general discussion, see Christoph T. Feddersen, Focusing on Substantive Law in International
Economic Relations: The Public Morals of GATT’s Article XX(a) and “Conventional” Rules of
Interpretation, 7 Minn J Global Trade 75 (1998).
See Bhagwati, 96 Am J Intl L at 133 (cited in note 54) (maintaining that Tuna’s anti-PPM tradition
should be respected because to allow countries to exclude products on PPM grounds, in
particular moral grounds, would be “opening a real Pandora’s box”).
See Charnovitz, 27 Yale J Intl Law at 62–63 (cited in note 116) (raising the possibility of “ecoimperialism”).
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McGinnis and Movsesian’s “antidiscrimination model” comes close to the
above position. This model advocates adjudication over legislation in addressing
linkage issues on the grounds that the former secures regulatory autonomy and
diversity and that it is less vulnerable to regulatory capture.121 Its central concern
is “antiprotectionism,” and it focuses particularly on disguised patterns of
discrimination such as “covert protectionism,” which are expressly aimed at
legitimate policy objectives, such as protection of health or the environment, but
which in practice impose burdens on competing importers.122 Since
protectionism is, according to McGinnis and Movsesian, the only evil that the
WTO should be concerned with expelling, they argue that the WTO should
leave intact all other scopes of regulations such as those serving “bona fide
public welfare function” regulations.123 According to this view, the WTO should
tolerate any kind of trade-restrictive regulation as long as it is nonprotectionist.
No matter what kind of disparate impact such regulation may have on free trade,
it is not the WTO’s business to remedy it.
The flaws in this approach are readily apparent because most of today’s
nontariff barriers tend to be based in arguably legitimate policy objectives. In
fact, the current WTO jurisprudence concerns mainly nonprotectionist, yet still
trade-restrictive regulations. In both the Gasoline (1996) and Shrimp-Turtle (1998)
cases, for example, the Appellate Body explicitly endorsed the legitimacy of the
US’s environmental regulations. Where the US encountered trouble was with
respect to the “chapeau test,” under which the regulation as applied was found to
jeopardize the interests of trading partners by omitting certain important
procedural steps including hearing or consultation. This was so despite its
legitimate, nonprotectionist environmental objectives. Not surprisingly,
McGinnis and Movsesian neglect to take the “chapeau test” seriously in
documenting the WTO’s early jurisprudential record.124 As a corollary, they fault
the Appellate Body’s emphasis on the “duty to negotiate” as a departure from
their antiprotectionist model.125 This narrow stance would not only exempt most
contemporary nontariff barriers from scrutiny, but also neglect an important
opportunity to build the very “world trade constitution” that they advocate for
this increasingly interdependent global economic setting.
A second method for justifying panel or Appellate Body intervention with
respect to social regulations not traditionally covered by Article XX is to expand
the interpretive reach of those provisions so as to accommodate social concerns
121
122
123
124
125

McGinnis and Movsesian, 114 Harv L Rev at 566–72 (cited in note 114).
Id at 549–50.
Id at 573.
Id at 589–94.
Id.
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beyond those explicitly enumerated. The meaning of Paragraph (a), which
protects “public morals,” is extensive and considerably inferential. The above
example of leg-hold traps could potentially be addressed under this paragraph.126
Similarly, Paragraph (d) recognizes an exception to secure compliance with or
enforce any domestic regulation as long as its objectives are consistent with the
WTO rules. Nonetheless, some would argue that a panel or the Appellate Body
should, upon encountering a case linking trade to regulatory issues not covered
by Article XX, simply refuse to adjudicate such cases because there is no
relevant substantive law. Therefore, the argument is that a panel or the Appellate
Body should avoid such cases in the first place by casting the non liquet excuse.
Yet others might offer the counterargument that such a narrow and positivistic
stance amounts to a “denial of justice” because it advocates the effective
abdication of an adjudicative body’s basic duty to resolve disputes and render
justice.127 This opposing view argues for the use of “general principles of law” to
fill in or supplement such lacunae.128 Indeed, most international law scholars
claim that “there is no room for non liquet in international adjudication because
there are no lacunae in international law.”129
In a departure from these positivistic or naturalistic understandings of
international law, Joel Trachtman contends that the general exception clause of
GATT Article XX should be employed to address such non liquet situations.130
He maintains that the provisions of Article XX should be deemed
“standards”—which are stipulated intentionally in a flexible way that permits
broad room for interpretation under the premise of “incomplete contracts”—
rather than “rule[s],”—which are specified a priori in a manner that leaves little
room for interpretation.131 Accordingly, Trachtman contends that tensions
arising from linkage issues should be resolved through these standards under
Article XX.132 Yet other scholars, including Debra Steger, oppose the stretching
of Article XX language on the ground that it would give too much power to
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See Feddersen, 7 Minn J Global Trade at 75 (cited in note 118).
See H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law 68–69 (Longmans, Green
1927).
Id.
Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Settlement Resolution, 40 Harv Intl L J 333, 341
(1999), quoting Prosper Weil, "The Court Cannot Conclude Definitively . . .": Non Liquet Revisited, 36
Colum J Transnatl L 109, 110 (1997).
See Trachtman, 40 Harv Intl L J at 346–69 (cited in note 129).
Id. Regarding more discussions on rules and standards within the context of international trade
law, see Joel P. Trachtman, International Trade as a Vector in Domestic Regulatory Reform: Discrimination,
Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Negotiations, 24 Fordham Intl L J 726 (2000).
Trachtman, 40 Harv Intl L J at 376 (cited in note 129).

656

Vol. 5 No. 2

Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation

Cho

quasi-judicial bodies.133 Based on her belief that linkage issues should be
addressed only in political terms, she prefers the amendment of Article XX to
accommodate contemporary regulatory concerns.134
A third method is for panels and the Appellate Body to refer to other
bodies of international law, such as multilateral environmental agreements or
labor conventions, in adjudicating linkage issues not covered by Article XX. This
approach is based on the proposition that the WTO should be an open system
rather than one that is closed and “self-contained.”135 WTO law should be
exposed to other disciplines of international law because WTO law is an
“important part of the larger system of public international law.”136 David
Palmeter and Petros Mavroidis contend that the WTO tribunal’s terms of
reference under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) Article 7137
should be interpreted to permit panels and the Appellate Body to employ
general sources of public international law, such as custom and general
principles of law, under Article 38 of the Statute of International Court of
Justice (“ICJ”).138 Furthermore, they take the view that the WTO tribunal should
embrace, as sources of law, non-WTO international agreements when they are
referred to or incorporated in the WTO’s covered agreements.139
In a similar context, Hudec focuses on a number of multilateral
environmental agreements (“MEAs”) that contain explicit or implicit trade
restrictions to achieve putative goals such as protection of endangered species or
regulation of substances that deplete the ozone layer, and that could
consequently be regarded to be in conflict with GATT/WTO rules.140 Hudec
argues that if all disputants are signatories of such MEAs, then any trade
133
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Steger, 96 Am J Intl L at 144 (cited in note 10).
Id at 140, 144.
José Alvarez argues that to define the WTO as a “self-contained regime” is unsustainable because
such an attempt would eventually undermine the legitimacy of the WTO. Alvarez, 7 Widener L
Symp J at 4 (cited in note 26). See also P.J. Kuyper, The Law of GATT as a Special Field of
International Law: Ignorance, Further Refinement or Self-Contained System of International Law?, 25 Neth
YB Intl L 227, 228 (1994).
David Palmeter and Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law, 92 Am J Intl L
398, 413 (1998).
WTO Agreement, Annex 2, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, art 7, in The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts
404, 410 (cited in note 1) (hereinafter DSU).
Palmeter and Mavroidis, 92 Am J Intl L at 399 (cited in note 136).
Id at 409–13. See also Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law
Relates to Other Rules of International Law 456–72 (Cambridge 2003) (viewing that the applicable law
before the WTO tribunal cannot be limited to the covered agreements).
Robert E. Hudec, GATT Legal Restraints on the Use of Trade Measures against Foreign Environmental
Practices, in Bhagwati and Hudec, eds, 2 Fair Trade and Harmonization 95, 121–22 (cited in note 13).
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restrictions authorized thereunder can be interpreted as constituting a “waiver”
of any inconsistent GATT obligations under the principle of lex posterior or lex
specialis.141 At the same time, Hudec acknowledges that a GATT violation is
inevitable where those trade restrictions are imposed on a WTO Member that is
not a signatory of the MEAs.142 To remedy this situation, he proposes the
establishment of an independent exception for such restrictions modeled after
GATT Article XX(h), which endorses trade restrictions arising in pursuit of
obligations set forth in certain international commodity agreements.143
Nonetheless, the latter proposal seems difficult to achieve, at least for the time
being, in view of the rather narrow scope of the relevant Doha agenda, which
mandates that “[t]he negotiations shall be limited in scope to the applicability of
such existing WTO rules as among parties to the MEA in question.”144
By contrast, certain other scholars reject this approach on the ground that
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism should be used only within the context
of covered agreements explicitly incorporated in the WTO Agreement.145
Trachtman, for example, maintains that the mandate of the WTO dispute
settlement system is to directly apply “only WTO law.”146 He predicates this
argument on several Dispute Settlement Understanding provisions, including
Article 3(2) providing that “[r]ecommendations and rulings of the DSB [Dispute
Settlement Body] cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided
in the covered agreements.”147 He also takes the view that this text would
amount to an absurdity if rights and obligations from other international treaties
were to be applied.148 Nonetheless, Trachtman leaves the door open for the
WTO to reference other bodies of international law either through adopting an
interpretive method that avoids conflict with other treaties, as in the “Charming
Betsy” doctrine,149 or by incorporating them indirectly based on Article XX.150
The fourth method involves judicial restraint, which is analogous to the
“political question” doctrine in certain domestic jurisdictions. For instance, a
141
142
143
144
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Id.
Id at 99, 125.
Id.
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration: The Fourth WTO Ministerial Meeting ¶ 31(i),
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov 20, 2001) (cited in note 84).
See, for example, Trachtman, 40 Harv Intl L J at 342–43 (cited in note 129).
Id at 342.
Id, quoting DSU, art 3(2) (cited in note 137).
Id.
Murray v Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 US 64, 118 (1804) (stating that “an act of Congress ought never
to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains . . .”).
See Trachtman, 40 Harv Intl L J at 343 (cited in note 129).
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GATT panel report, albeit one that was unadopted, refused to adjudicate a case
involving a regional trading agreement under GATT Article XXIV on the
ground that the “examination—or re-examination—of Article XXIV
agreements was the responsibility of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.” 151 In a
practical sense, it might be advisable to avoid certain highly “political” cases that
could be addressed in an out-of-court setting or deferred to domestic
governments. If highly controversial cases of this type were to be
overadjudicated under the WTO, the inevitable political backlash could do
severe damage to its still frail legal integrity. As Alvarez trenchantly observes,
certain “fundamentally political issues” should not be simply turned over to the
WTO jurisprudence without a “political consensus.”152 Reflecting similar
concerns, the European Court of Justice has shown great deference in
addressing certain domestic regulations marked by strong “socio-cultural
characteristics.” Admittedly, it would be difficult for a panel or the Appellate
Body to refuse to adjudicate a case before it without a reason. To avoid
needlessly placing it in this position, Members should exercise forbearance
rather than testing the WTO dispute settlement system by filing highly
politicized or scandalized cases.
These four methods possess both pros and cons, and it would be
imprudent to apply any one of them mechanically without due regard to a
particular linkage issue’s specific circumstances. Overall, the first method—the
“aim and effect” test—carries serious risks considering its potential for abuse or
misuse, notwithstanding the fact that many scholars and government officials
continue to embrace its logic, as seen in the recent Asbestos case.153 Similarly, it
seems that the fourth method—judicial restraint—would not only be difficult
for a panel or the Appellate Body to accept but also risky considering the high
potential for political backlash from governments and NGOs pursuing
151

152

153

GATT, Report of the Panel, European Community—Tariff Treatment on Imports of Citrus Products from
Certain Countries in the Mediterranean Region ¶¶ 4.15–16, WTO Doc No L/5776, GATT BISD
260L/5776 (1985) (unadopted).
Alvarez, 7 Widener L Symp J at 19 (cited in note 26). But see C.W. Jenks, Craftsmanship in
International Law, in Leo Gross, ed, International Law in the Twentieth Century 75, 80 (AppletonCentury-Crofts 1969) (maintaining that “[a] jurisprudence which . . . ignores or belittles the
limitations with which the rule of law operates in practice in international affairs in the present
stage of development of the law, and a jurisprudence which rationalizes, defends and even
idealizes these limitations, are equally unhelpful and unserviceable”).
See Cho, Free Markets and Social Regulation at 26 (cited in note 56) (criticizing the Appellate Body’s
problematic revival of the “aim and effect” test in the Asbestos case). See also World Trade
Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 172, WTO Doc No WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar 12, 2001); World Trade
Organization, Report of the Panel, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and AsbestosContaining Products, WTO Doc No WT/DS135/R (Sept 18, 2000).
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regulatory goals that may be characterized by a strongly moralistic streak. In
contrast, the second and third methods—expanding the interpretive reach of
provisions and drawing on other bodies of international law—are practicable if
employed with due caution. Given the extreme difficulty associated with
mobilizing sufficient political capital to actually amend GATT Article XX,
reliance upon some type of judicial innovation seems inevitable. For instance, in
Shrimp-Turtle, the Appellate Body succeeded in enhancing its adjudicative
credibility by formulating a teleological, evolutionary approach to interpreting
“exhaustible natural resources” under GATT Article XX(g) to include
endangered species such as sea turtles.154 Yet the main challenge to continued
judicial innovation lies in the question of whether subtle and nuanced panels and
the Appellate Body will prove both willing and able to move in this direction to
address the linkage cases that come before them. Only time and experience will
tell.
Notwithstanding the potential availability of these four methods, the
bottom line is that the development of a synergistic solution to the linkage
problem within the traditional GATT framework will require still other
resources and innovations, due partly to the inherent pro-trade dichotomy
discussed above, and partly to the lacunae of Article XX, among other concerns.
Accordingly, our task requires us to look beyond GATT jurisprudence to
discover additional resources in other parts of the WTO system, such as in the
side agreements: for example, the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (“SPS”) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers on Trade (“TBT”).

2. Harmonization
A number of scholars have sought to tackle linkage issues more directly
and systematically than through jurisprudence. These scholars advocate the use
of legislation (treaty making) for the purpose of harmonizing diverse sectorspecific social regulations. In a rather bold example of this general approach,
Andrew Guzman proposes to use the legislative process to address linkage
issues—in other words, to accommodate nontrade issues such as labor and
competition—within the WTO. First, Guzman proposes that a number of
separate “departments” for major linkage areas be created within the existing
structure of the WTO. These departments, an example of which might be a socalled “trade and labor departments,” would conduct specialized negotiations in
the form of “departmental rounds.”155 These would, in turn, be followed by
154
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World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products ¶ 129, WTO Doc No WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct 12, 1998) (cited in
note 103).
Andrew T. Guzman, Trade, Labor, Legitimacy, 91 Cal L Rev 885, 889–90 (2003).
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“Mega-Rounds” in which cross-departmental bargains could be made.156
Through this process Guzman envisions the emergence of WTO agreements on
labor or competition policy that would be patterned after the TRIPs
Agreement.157 In its maximal form, Guzman’s expansionist vision would effect
the transformation of the WTO into a “World Economic Organization.”158
Yet Guzman’s ambitious proposal is vulnerable to a number of criticisms.
First is the issue of money. Even if one assumes that Members will be able to
secure the necessary political capital, will they be able to afford the huge
financial and human resources needed to establish such departments? The
budget forecast on this point seems especially gloomy when one considers that
the WTO’s total budget is currently less than the travel budget of the IMF.159
Second, Guzman seems to rely heavily on the success of the Uruguay
Round, especially on the creation of TRIPs. However, it should be remembered
that the Uruguay Round’s “single package” deal was possible mainly because it
reflected the principle of “comparative advantage” between the North and the
South. In other words, the South was willing to tolerate new accords relating to
services and intellectual property, areas in which the North holds a comparative
advantage, in exhange for further liberalization in the area of agriculture and
textiles, in which the South holds its own comparative advantage. By contrast,
Guzman’s regulatory bargaining scheme is based not on such a principled
trajectory but on blatant quid pro quo deals that tend to favor politically powerful
countries. Yet what if a Member has nothing to offer? Is it realistic to assume
that such a Member would actually be excluded from the bargaining process, as
Guzman’s approach would seem to suggest? Would that be a desirable result?
And what about the reality that small, poor countries have very few personnel
and other resources to devote to these complicated bargains?160
Third, the “regulatory model,” which attempts to harmonize or
universalize regulatory standards within the WTO, has proven vulnerable to
attack on many fronts. In addressing the problem of covert protectionism, for
example, McGinnis and Movsesian reject the regulatory model on the following
grounds: universal regulatory standards do not fit all countries, it is vulnerable to
capture by powerful interest groups, regulatory competition is desirable,
universal standards are likely to result in a race to the bottom, and international
156
157
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Guzman, 45 Harv Intl L J at 307–08 (cited in note 98).
Id; Andrew T. Guzman, Antitrust and International Regulatory Federalism, 76 NYU L Rev 1142 (2001);
Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 NYU L Rev 1501 (1998).
Guzman, 45 Harv Intl L J at 309 (cited in note 98).
Bhagwati, 96 Am J Intl L at 132 (cited in note 54).
See John O. McGinnis and Mark L. Movsesian, Against Global Governance in the WTO, 45 Harv Intl
L J 353, 357 (2004).
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spillover disputes exceed the institutional capacity as well as the legitimacy of the
WTO.161 McGinnis and Movsesian do view reciprocal bargaining as the “engine”
of the WTO regime in that it yields incentives for free trade supporters to
counteract protectionist groups in the domestic political dynamics.162 Moreover,
they attribute the success of the Uruguay Round to its structure as a single
undertaking in which North and South were able to engage in such reciprocal
bargaining.163 Yet in contrast to “political bargaining,” they object to “regulatory
bargains” in the context of regulatory models such as that proposed by Guzman
on the ground that it is too vulnerable to interest group capture, among other
concerns.164
Fourth, Guzman’s approach seeks to take advantage of the wellfunctioning WTO dispute settlement system in order to enhance the level of
compliance with regulatory agreements. Yet apart from the daunting logistical
challenges associated with finding qualified experts, Guzman’s approach would
inundate the WTO system with a category of disputes highly resistant to
settlement. For instance, what if certain poor countries repeatedly violated
regulatory agreements due to a lack of financial and technical capability? It does
not seem realistic or even prudent to resolve such cases in an adjudicative mode.
Indeed, if Member countries anticipate the prospect of adjudication in the
future, their levels of commitment to and concessions in the negotiating process
are likely to be low.
Chantal Thomas takes a rather eclectic position vis-à-vis Guzman’s
approach. Although he also prioritizes legislation over adjudication in addressing
linkage issues, particularly labor and environmental protection, Thomas
acknowledges that legislation in the form of separate, stand-alone agreements
carries in its negotiation process certain costs and risks—including “specification
costs” incurred in determining “core” labor or environmental standards as well
as “capture” and “strategic holdout.”165 Thomas’s response to these problems is
a softer form of legislation: an amendment of the list of general exceptions
under GATT Article XX to incorporate certain international labor and
environmental principles.166 Notwithstanding its comparatively modest
dimensions, Thomas’ approach still seems unworkable considering that it is
nearly as difficult to secure an amendment under the WTO system as it is to
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McGinnis and Movsesian, 114 Harv L Rev at 553–66 (cited in note 114).
Id at 545.
Id at 545–46.
McGinnis and Movsesian, 45 Harv Intl L J at 355–56 (cited in note 160).
Thomas, 61 Wash & Lee L Rev at 374–88 (cited in note 98).
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produce new legislation.167 Moreover, an amendment carries the same costs and
risks as stand-alone legislative agreements in that WTO Members would still
need to agree on which principles should be referenced in Article XX. The devil
is always in the details.
By contrast, harmonization under the WTO can be achieved more
effectively through preexisting built-in legislative arrangements than through the
creation of new ones. The WTO system has already launched two important side
agreements, the SPS168 and the TBT,169 in order to supplement and complement
GATT—particularly Article XX. The Preamble of SPS states that it desires to
“elaborate rules for the application of the provisions of GATT 1994 which relate
to the use of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, in particular the provisions of
Article XX(b).”170 Likewise, the Preamble of TBT states that it desires to “further
the objectives of GATT 1994.”171 The most distinctive feature in these two
agreements vis-à-vis GATT is an absence of the type of dichotomy that
characterized GATT’s pro-trade bias. The preambles of both agreements
emphasize that no Members should be prevented from taking necessary measures
to protect social values such as human health or the environment. Moreover,
these legitimate regulatory concerns are no longer marginalized as mere
“exceptions,” but have been redefined as “rights.” For instance, SPS Article 2
specifies that Members have the right to take sanitary measures necessary for the
protection of human health. At the same time, both agreements overcome the
lacunae in GATT Article XX by providing for an extensive and flexible clause
dealing with legitimate regulatory objectives. In other words, SPS applies to all
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, which are defined broadly in Annex A of
the WTO Agreement. In the same context, TBT covers technical regulations
adopted pursuant to any legitimate policy objective.
Although they grant enhanced status to social regulatory concerns, it
cannot be argued that these agreements are biased in favor of them. Rather, they
prudently provide many obligations related to free trade considerations in order
to avoid such bias. Therefore, while they emphasize the rights of Members to
take necessary regulations to achieve their legitimate policy objectives, the
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WTO Agreement, art IX (“Decision-Making”), art X (“Amendments”) at 11, 12 (cited in note 4).
WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, in The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts 69
(cited in note 1) (hereinafter SPS).
WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, in The Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts 138 (cited in note 1) (hereinafter
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SPS, preamble at 70 (cited in note 168).
TBT, preamble at 138 (cited in note 169).
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agreements also stipulate that such regulations “do not create unnecessary
obstacles to international trade”172 and that they remain “subject to the
requirement that [they] are not applied in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.”173 In addition, both
agreements contain numerous provisions, many of which are similar to those of
GATT. The subtle equilibrium between trade and social concerns featured in
these agreements constitutes a major improvement over GATT, which to this
day retains a lingering pro-trade bias due to the structural dichotomy discussed
above.
Harmonization, which is the basic approach that both SPS and TBT
employ in dealing with linkage, is a positive prescription. In this sense it
contrasts with the negative prescription observed in the jurisprudence related to
GATT Articles III and XX. Whereas the latter focuses on negative obligations
that prohibit discrimination and other market access restrictions, the former
concerns positive obligations that aim at the assimilation or convergence of
substantive or procedural aspects of different domestic regulations. Normally,
harmonization connotes legislative initiatives on substantive regulations or
standards.174 In this respect, both SPS and TBT encourage Members to align
their domestic regulations in various ways to internationally recognized
standards. Because these international standards, no matter how representative
they may be in certain specific regulatory sectors, are adopted outside the WTO,
they are nonbinding. Nonetheless, both agreements offer legal incentives to
Members in order to further voluntary compliance with nonbinding norms. For
example, under SPS, if a Member bases its sanitary regulation on the Codex
Alimentarius, one of the international standards that SPS endorses, it is
presumed to comply with the relevant provisions of both SPS and GATT.
International standards will be discussed below in greater detail.
Yet both SPS and TBT give much more weight to circumstances in which
Members do not rely on international standards than those in which Members
do. There are a couple of reasons for this situation. First, the use of international
standards is nonbinding and voluntary because they are not formal treaties
legislated under the banner of the WTO. Therefore, Members retain the right to
take any necessary measures, whether based on the relevant international
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TBT, preamble at 138 (cited in note 169).
SPS, preamble at 69 (cited in note 168).
Leebron found justifications of harmonization on two main grounds: first, “[j]urisdictional
interface” in the face of which nations tend to reduce transaction costs of international commerce
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standards or not, to achieve other legitimate objectives such as protection of
human health and safety. Second, in many cases these standards are nonexistent.
Even where they do exist, they tend still to be evolving, often taking the form of
a lowest common denominator, and thus fall short of the regulatory
expectations of Members accustomed to exercising a higher level of regulatory
protection in similar situations encountered at the domestic level. These
circumstances tend to lead both SPS and TBT to focus on “process-oriented”
disciplines, rather than on substantive disciplines involving international
standards. In other words, these agreements concern “how to regulate,” rather
than “what to regulate.” This “manner-oriented” approach parallels the “chapeau
test” recently found in the WTO jurisprudence and constitutes a keystone in
addressing linkage problems within the context of SPS and TBT because the
approach enables Members to retain their regulatory autonomy while minimizing
the trade-restrictive effects of their regulations. It does so by ensuring
administrative due process in such areas as risk assessment, consistency,
transparency, and reason giving. Therefore, as David Victor observes, these due
process disciplines focus on “convergence in procedures” but not necessarily
“convergence in particular regulatory outcomes.”175 In this sense, both SPS and
TBT constitute a form of quasi-harmonization.

3. Surveillance
Trade disputes are not brewed overnight. Rather, trade frictions usually
precede the outbreak of full-fledged disputes. Once a dispute is announced,
registered, and adjudicated, it is very easy for it to escalate beyond the control of
the parties. Therefore, if frictions can be diffused before they reach the level of
disputes, much time, energy and expense will be saved. Trade disputes related to
linkage issues are no exception. This is why a surveillance and monitoring
mechanism such as the Trade Policy Review Mechanism is required.176
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David G. Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of the World Trade Organization: An
Assessment after Five Years, 32 NYU J Intl L & Pol 865, 872 (2000).
See TPRM, ¶ A at 434 (cited in note 97). See also World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Reviews:
ensuring transparency, available online at <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/
agrm11_e.htm> (visited Nov 10, 2004).
“Individuals and companies involved in trade have to know as much as
possible about the conditions of trade. It is therefore fundamentally important
that regulations and policies are transparent. In the WTO, this is achieved in
two ways: governments have to inform the WTO and fellow-members of
specific measures, policies or laws through regular ‘notifications’; and the
WTO conducts regular reviews of individual countries’ trade policies—the
trade policy reviews.”
Id.
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The TPRM periodically reviews Member countries’ trade policies and
trade-related regulatory policies for the “improved adherence by all Members to
rules, disciplines and commitments”177 under the WTO system. For this
purpose, each Member is required to report its trade policies and practices on a
regular basis to the Trade Policy Review Body, which is another name for the
WTO General Council.178 The TPRM is basically a “peer review” process,179
rather than an enforcement mechanism. Thanks to the managerial nature of this
process, Members can fine-tune both their trade and trade-related regulatory
policies to address the interface between free trade and state regulation in an
inconspicuous yet effective fashion. This may be accomplished through informal
discussion and deliberation free from undue escalation and politicization.180

4. International Standards and Government Networks
As discussed above, harmonization through international standards, no
matter how soft those standards may be from the perspective of legal force, could
be a way of addressing linkage issues in certain areas since it would enable
adopting Members to achieve the dual goals of free trade and regulatory
protection. In fact, both TBT and SBS expressly require Member States to use
international standards to the maximum extent possible, as well as to participate
vigorously in standard-setting activities.181 In addition, both TBT and SBS give a
burden of proof incentive to any Member State that bases its regulation on
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TPRM, ¶ A at 434 (cited in note 97).
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See Cho, Free Markets and Social Regulation at 160–61 (cited in note 56).
TBT, art 2.4 at 140 (cited in note 169) (“Where technical regulations are required and relevant
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international standards.182 Furthermore, as an obvious indication of their role in
encouraging transgovernmental cooperation for regulatory harmonization, both
TBT and SBS co-opt certain international regulatory institutions including the
International Organization for Standardization (“ISO”),183 the International
Electrotechnical Commission (“IEC”),184 and the “Codex Alimentarius
Commission.”185 These co-opted regulatory institutions serve as shells for
transgovernmental cooperation under the auspices of TBT and SPS.
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the standards set forth in such
agreements has often been questioned. While international standards may reflect
certain professional values since they are crafted by qualified experts, the
domestic administrative and political procedures involved in actually
recognizing, accrediting, and finally adopting these standards tend to be more
complicated than they first appear. We often see that political anxiety
surrounding a certain regulatory area is allowed to trump scientific evidence. The
public tends to react emotionally and excessively to a scandalous event such as
an outbreak of mad cow disease. When confronting such situations,
governments usually respond by pandering to public concern and strengthening
regulations, rather than by educating the public in a manner that reduces
excessive fear. Moreover, as human health and safety command greater political
attention, consensus becomes harder than ever to achieve, even among the
professionals charged with developing the standards.186
Notwithstanding these misgivings about international standards, the
importance of close cooperation and communication among epistemic, likeminded regulators, which many scholars define as “networking,”187 should not
182
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be trivialized. Although very few government networks produce visible
regulations in the form of standards or guidelines, networking itself tends to
contribute to the achievement of regulatory objectives because regulators learn
from and enlighten one another in the process of communicating and
exchanging views. In particular, if regulatory networking is conducted under the
auspices of the WTO, in a manner that takes into account the subtle interface
between regulatory and trade issues, it could potentially provide a reliable way of
addressing some linkage issues. Admittedly, networking does not deliver a readymade solution to the linkage problem as a whole. Yet networking certainly can
ease the tension arising from linkage phenomena on an incremental basis
because everyday regulators who are educated in the networking process can
modify and adapt their regulatory behaviors—again, on an incremental scale—
toward a better approach to reconciling the tension. Even if such networking is
obstructed by complicated political processes, whether between North and
South or within North or South, its forum-making function will at least
contribute to increasing transparency in the WTO’s policy-making process as
well as to enhancing the level of policy coordination among states, as seen in the
example of the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (“CTE”).188
The case for the aforementioned “soft” approach, vis-à-vis the “hard”
approach represented by formal negotiations and legislation, becomes stronger
in light of the reality of current WTO negotiations. First, developing countries
have already officially “de-link[ed]” labor from trade by nailing down a firm
statement in Ministerial Declarations that the International Labor Organization
(“ILO”) is the competent body for handling this issue, and that the use of labor
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standards for protectionist purposes should be prohibited.189 Moreover, it seems
unlikely that linkage issues would be addressed within the WTO through hard
mechanisms such as legislation (treaty making) or amendment, at least in the
near future. The fact that developed countries finally agreed, albeit reluctantly, to
drop three of four “Singapore issues” from the Doha Round negotiation
supports such a forecast.190 Singapore issues—in other words, competition,
investment, government procurement, and trade facilitation—were originally
tabled and accepted as a potential negotiation agenda by developed countries in
the first WTO Ministerial Conference in 1996.191 Since that time they have
haunted subsequent WTO negotiations. Frequently invoked by developed
countries as red herrings to counteract the demands of developing countries to
repeal agricultural subsidies, the Singapore Issues eventually sunk the fifth
Ministerial Conference in Cancún in 2003.192 Yet during negotiations conducted
under the Doha Round—which is often dubbed the “development round”—
rich countries finally agreed to jettison competition and investment issues while
at the same time repealing or reducing agricultural subsidies. Based on this case,
it seems strategic linkages are not likely to happen, at least in the foreseeable
future. Under these circumstances, a calm, modest yet incrementally effective
approach to linkage, using soft law and cooperative networking, seems to be
more suitable than a hard, politically driven approach involving formal
negotiations and legislation.
Importantly, networking need not be conducted solely within the WTO.
The WTO is still a trade organization. The fact that the WTO should faithfully
listen and respond to legitimate demands of linkage does not mean that it should
metamorphose into something other than a trade organization. No matter how
successful it has been as a trade organization, the WTO should not become a
victim of its own success by seeking to accommodate all other nontrade issues
under its own roof. Moreover, the WTO is not an island in the international
community.193 Diverse international institutional arrangements may lend the
189
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WTO their more flexible, yet focused hands to address linkages issues in a
variety of ways, degrees, and contexts.
Indeed, regulatory networking often takes place in softer institutional
settings than the WTO, such as the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (“OECD”) or Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (“APEC”).
The institutional flexibility represented by the informality and nonbinding nature
of these organizations can encourage participants to explore solutions to various
linkage scenarios through the application of soft law (recommendations,
standards, and guidelines), without the burden of legal commitments and the
associated practice of strategic filibustering.194 In fact, both organizations are
currently devoting considerable resources to addressing various linkage issues.
Under APEC, both regulators (public) and regulatees (private) engage in close
epistemic networking with one another on sector-specific linkage issues such as
trade and human safety, thereby producing realistic guidelines and
arrangements.195 Empirical confirmation of this process exists in such forms as
the Guidelines for the Preparation, Adoption, and Review of Technical
Regulations and APEC Food Mutual Recognition Agreements (“MRA”).196
Under the OECD, linkage issues are addressed in the context of
“regulatory reform.”197 This project is a policy response to the belief that
modern governments should secure better regulations while not yielding to trade
barriers.198 A comprehensive 1997 Report on Regulatory Reform strongly
recommended the use of soft law, in the form of “internationally harmoni[z]ed
standards,” to solve the linkage dilemma.199 In parallel with this Report, the
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OECD Program on Public Management and Governance (“PUMA”) has been
hosting the Regulatory Management and Reform Network that consists of
government officials responsible for regulatory management and reform
activities in Member countries.200
In a propitious move, an APEC-OECD Agreement on Joint Work on
Regulatory Reform was initiated in 2000. The Joint Work aims to implement
OECD and APEC principles by elaborating an APEC-OECD “Integrated
Checklist” for self-assessment on linkage issues, such as “regulatory, competition
and market openness policies.”201
In sum, this softer approach to linkage tends to emphasize that linkage
issues are better “managed” than “solved.” After countries have built up
sufficient confidence and consensus following a lengthy rehearsal process, they
may ratchet up to a harder, more official forum such as the WTO. Put
differently, current circumstances suggest that osmosis seems to work better
than compulsion.

5. Interinstitutional Cooperation
The WTO’s institutional identity as a trade organization naturally leads it to
addressing various linkage issues by cooperating in various ways with sectorspecific international regulatory organizations. Scholars acknowledge the
importance of this interinstitutional relationship. Robert Howse argues that we
should try to shape the trade rules and their interpretations to capture the
“interaction[s]” of the trading system with other institutions, rather than attempt
to decide what should be “in” or “out of” the mandate of the WTO.202 This
argument reflects David Leebron’s idea of “regime linkage,” which describes
possible interactions between regimes that are created to govern specific
regulatory issues.203
The intensity of such interinstitutional cooperation varies according to the
circumstances presented by each linkage phenomenon. One encounters both
mild and intense interinstitutional relationships between the WTO and other
international regulatory agencies. In terms of mild institutional relationships,
which call to mind the aforementioned patterns of networking, the Doha
Declaration explicitly set a negotiation agenda for “regular information
200
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exchange” between the MEAs’ secretariats and the CTE as well as the MEAs’
“observer status” in the CTE.204 In implementing this agenda, Members have
recently agreed on the observer status, albeit on an ad hoc basis, of the United
Nations Environmental Program (“UNEP”) and the following six MEAs: the
Basel Convention on Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and
Fauna (“CITES”), the Convention on Biodiversity (“CBD”), the Montreal
Protocol on Ozone-depleting Substances, the International Tropical Timber
Organization (“ITTO”), and the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change (“UNFCCC”).205 This institutional cooperation between the WTO’s
CTE and MEAs can make a major contribution to ensuring “coherence”
between trade and environmental policies,206 thereby mitigating the tension
between free trade and environmental protection in the long run.
Yet it is difficult in practice to forge robust relationships among
organizations. Although the WTO has several “cooperation agreements” with
other international organizations such as the IMF,207 the practical value of such
agreements has been questionable because the level of involvement of these
organizations in the WTO, at least in terms of regulatory cooperation, has not
been impressive. Several factors may explain this lack of cooperation. First, the
WTO’s scant budget tends to discourage serious interinstitutional engagement,
which inevitably requires considerable resources and investment. Second,
networks linking domestic and international bureaucrats working in trade and
other social policy areas are not well developed. Because bureaucrats or
policymakers from each trade sector or nontrade social policy area tend to
represent their own values, a coherent forum to bring these disparate views
together in one place is unlikely to emerge on its own. Rather, such a forum
204
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must be created, which inevitably involves the commitment of considerable
institutional resources. Finally, difficult problems of jurisdiction and competence
are likely to cloud any serious effort at resolving the linkage dilemma. Indeed,
the question of what institution should be the final arbiter as to a particular
subject matter extends well beyond the terrain of cooperation to the
constitutional dimension.
It could be the case that the WTO’s “unilateral” adoption of certain
regulatory decisions by other international agencies, in the form of “cooptation,” will work better than the infeasible forms of institutional cooperation
discussed above. Originally, the concept of co-optation derives from the field of
corporations. Co-optation represents a process of incorporating new elements
into the policymaking structure of an organization in order to overcome
challenges to its stability.208 Considering the mounting tension between trade and
social values, which has the potential to undermine the legitimacy of the global
trading system, it seems not only plausible but also necessary for the WTO to
absorb certain sector-specific regulatory elements into its operation. In this
connection, it is worthwhile to note that the WTO’s two important linkage
agreements, SPS and TBT, were modeled after the EU’s harmonization rules
and practices, in particular the New Approach and the Global Approach.209
Another interesting channel of co-optation is the WTO tribunal. As a
matter of fact, a panel organized under the old GATT sought a regulatory
opinion from other international regulatory institutions in adjudicating a trade
case before it. Specifically, the panel in the Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of
and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes case referred to the World Health Organization
(“WHO”) the question of whether the Thai government’s ban on Western
cigarettes could be justified to protect human health. Although the panel
eventually dismissed the WHO’s professional regulatory opinion, this case
provides a strong precedent for future judicial co-optation within the context of
the GATT dispute settlement procedure. The DSU subsequently provided a
textual ground for such judicial co-optation in the form of the stipulation that
“[p]anels may seek information from any relevant source and may consult experts
to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the matter.”210 It is not difficult for
208
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international regulatory institutions to be interpreted as falling under the rubric of
“any relevant source.” At the same time, regulatory decisions co-opted by panels
and the Appellate Body from other international agencies need not bind them.

V. C ONCLUSION
This Article highlights the potentially perilous tension between free trade
and social regulation, and suggests a multifaceted list of solutions based on
institutional feasibility. The global trading system has come to require a new telos
capable of transcending the narrow purpose of antiprotection while at the same
time connoting a much broader ideal of “integration” that ensures that both
trade values and social values are upheld not in a competing, but in a coherent
and synergetic fashion. This constitutional vision, which is embedded in the
concept of linkage itself, inevitably touches on the profound issue of
“legitimacy.” The global trading system is “composed not only of States but also,
indeed mostly, of individual economic operators,” such as producers, importers,
and consumers.211 There is an inseparable connection between the ever growing
quantity of international business transactions and the discipline provided by
international trade law. If the dual goal of free markets and social regulation is
achieved in a coherent way within the far reaching field of international
economic law, it will make the global trading system operate in a more stable
and predictable way,212 and thus enhance its general acceptability not only among
governments, but also among ordinary people.
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